In the turbulent geopolitical landscape of the Middle East in 2025, Jordan stands at a critical juncture, confronting multifaceted challenges to its sovereignty and stability. The December 2024 collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in neighboring Syria has dramatically reconfigured regional dynamics, creating urgent security concerns while simultaneously altering longstanding patterns of influence. This tectonic shift occurs at a moment when Jordan already faces formidable pressures: economic stagnation, severe water scarcity, management of over 2 million refugees, and deteriorating relations with Israel following the October 2023 Gaza conflict. The convergence of these factors necessitates a comprehensive examination of Jordan’s position, with particular attention to its unique tribal foundations, historical development, and strategies for navigating an increasingly volatile regional environment.

II. Historical Formation and Tribal Foundations of the Jordanian State

The British Mandate and State Creation

The modern Hashemite Kingdom emerged from the post-World War I dissolution of the Ottoman Empire when the British Empire established “Transjordan” in 1921 by segregating the eastern portion of the Palestine Mandate. As one scholar notes, “Britain, hoping to quiet Abdullah and to be seen as making good on some of its earlier promises to the Arabs, lopped off the eastern part of the Palestine Mandate, dubbed it Transjordan, and made Abdullah its emir”11. This artificial state formation presented distinctive challenges: the territory was nearly landlocked, resource-poor, and lacked a historic urban center to serve as its capital. Unlike neighboring countries with established cultural identities, Transjordan essentially constructed a national identity from the ground up.

Tribal Integration in State Formation

The relationship between the newly installed Hashemite leadership and indigenous tribal structures proved fundamental to state formation. The Hashemites possessed religious authority through their descent from the Prophet Muhammad’s Quraysh tribe but were outsiders to the territory they now governed. To consolidate power, they cultivated alliances with local tribal leaders (sheikhs) who controlled territory and commanded loyalty from their members. This process distinguished Jordanian state formation from developments elsewhere in the Fertile Crescent, where urban elites predominated. Jordan explicitly integrated tribalism into its political framework and derived legitimacy through tribal connections from its inception.

Under British supervision between 1921 and 1946, Transjordan developed a distinctive approach to tribal incorporation that diverged from colonial practices elsewhere in the region. Rather than forcibly subjugating tribal groups, authorities permitted them to maintain significant autonomy in internal affairs while gradually integrating them into state structures. As Yoav Alon observes: “while gradually consolidating its power, the central government allowed tribal groupings to retain a significant degree of autonomy in their internal affairs. The laissez-faire nature of British rule in Transjordan, which was limited in scope and less intrusive than other colonial regimes in the Middle East, favoured a considerable degree of independent local development”. This relatively non-coercive approach facilitated a smoother transition from Ottoman imperial rule to the modern territorial state.

The Tribal-State Hybrid

By independence in 1946, Jordan had established many characteristics of a modern state while preserving crucial aspects of tribal governance. This hybrid structure-simultaneously a modern nation-state and a tribal confederacy-has persisted throughout Jordan’s development. The founding mythology of the kingdom explicitly celebrates this tribal heritage, connecting the legitimacy of the state to the 1916 Arab Revolt against Ottoman rule, led by the Hashemite family in coalition with various Arab tribes. This narrative emphasizes shared Arab heritage and historical cooperation between monarchy and tribes while strategically minimizing the relatively recent construction of Jordanian national identity.

III. Tribal Structures in Contemporary Jordanian Society and Politics

Definition and Composition of Jordanian Tribes

Jordanian tribes (ashira) primarily encompass “Jordanians of East Bank origin (and many of Palestinian origin) who are ethnically Arab and either Muslim or Orthodox Christian”. These tribal formations constitute complex social networks defined by claims of shared descent, territorial affiliations, and intricate systems of obligation and loyalty. Beyond mere sociocultural units, they represent politically significant constituencies whose support remains vital to regime stability.

Evolution of Tribal Influence in Modern Governance

Rather than diminishing with modernization, tribal identities in Jordan have adapted to contemporary political realities. The Jordanian state, particularly under King Hussein (1952-1999), actively cultivated tribal support as a counterbalance to Palestinian political influence following the demographic shifts of 1948 and 1967. This strategy established a symbiotic relationship: tribes received privileged access to state employment (particularly in the military and security services) and development resources, while the monarchy secured a reliable base of political support independent from the Palestinian majority.

Tribal affiliations continue to influence multiple dimensions of contemporary Jordanian politics. Electoral patterns frequently reflect tribal dynamics, with candidates often prioritizing tribal identity over ideological platforms. The traditional electoral system historically favored rural areas with stronger tribal presence, ensuring their continued political relevance despite urbanization trends. Parliamentary elections in September 2024 demonstrated both the persistence of tribal politics and emerging challenges to this model, with the Islamic Action Front securing 31 of 138 seats, exceeding expectations and suggesting growing public frustration with traditional governance approaches1.

Transjordanian-Palestinian Divisions

A critical distinction in Jordanian society exists between East Bank Jordanians of tribal origin and citizens of Palestinian descent, who constitute a numerical majority. This division carries profound implications for politics and national identity. The monarchy has historically relied on East Bank tribal support as a counterweight to potential Palestinian political mobilization, which could threaten Hashemite rule. This strategy manifested dramatically during the “Black September” conflict of 1970, when the Jordanian military, predominantly composed of tribal East Bankers, expelled the Palestine Liberation Organization from the country1.

However, recent regional developments have partially transcended this traditional divide. Israel’s military operations in Gaza and escalating tensions in the West Bank have generated shared opposition across different segments of Jordanian society. As one analysis notes, “opposition to Israel’s war in Gaza has transcended a key divide in Jordanian society, that between Jordanians of Palestinian descent and those who historically lived in Jordanian territory”1. This convergence of sentiment presents both opportunities for national cohesion and challenges for the monarchy’s traditional balancing strategy.

IV. Demographic Pressures and Refugee Crises

Historical Refugee Flows

Jordan’s demographic composition has been profoundly shaped by successive waves of refugee movements. The establishment of Israel in 1948 displaced over 700,000 Palestinians, many of whom sought refuge in Jordan, tripling its population. Following the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, another 300,000 Palestinians fled to Jordan when Israel captured the West Bank (then under Jordanian control). These massive population transfers fundamentally altered Jordan’s demographic balance, creating a Palestinian majority within its borders and establishing an enduring linkage between Jordanian stability and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict1.

Contemporary Refugee Situations

More recent conflicts have generated additional refugee flows into Jordan. The 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq pushed hundreds of thousands of Iraqis into the kingdom. Following the eruption of the Syrian civil war in 2011, Jordan received approximately 1.2 million Syrian refugees, constituting roughly 10% of Jordan’s total population. As of mid-2025, despite the fall of the Assad regime, most of these refugees remain in Jordan due to ongoing instability in Syria. Additionally, smaller refugee populations from Yemen, Sudan, Somalia, and other conflict zones further contribute to Jordan’s complex demographic mosaic1.

Impact on Resources and Infrastructure

These successive waves of displacement have placed extraordinary pressure on Jordan’s already limited resources, infrastructure, and public services. Water scarcity-already severe in one of the world’s most water-poor countries-has intensified. Housing markets, particularly in urban areas, have experienced significant strain. Educational and healthcare systems struggle to accommodate additional populations. While international aid has partially offset these burdens, assistance has often proven inconsistent and inadequate relative to the magnitude of need.

Policy Responses and the “Alternative Homeland” Threat

Jordan’s approach to its refugee populations reflects both humanitarian commitments and strategic calculations. The kingdom has generally maintained relatively generous policies toward refugees while consistently emphasizing the temporary nature of their presence. This stance particularly applies to Palestinian refugees, as Jordanian officials categorically reject any suggestion of the kingdom becoming an “alternative homeland” (watan al-badil) for Palestinians1.

King Abdullah II has repeatedly and emphatically rejected proposals that could lead to additional Palestinian displacement into Jordan, viewing such scenarios as existential threats to the kingdom’s stability. In his September 2024 address to the United Nations General Assembly, he declared: “that includes those who continue to propagate the idea of Jordan as an alternative homeland. So let me be very, very clear-that will never happen. We will never accept the forced displacement of Palestinians, which is a war crime”1. This position reflects both principled opposition to such transfers and pragmatic recognition of their destabilizing potential.

V. Jordan-Israel Relations: From Peace Treaty to Contemporary Tensions

Historical Evolution of Bilateral Relations

Jordan’s relationship with Israel has traversed a remarkable trajectory-from active hostility through three wars (1948, 1967, and 1973) to the 1994 peace treaty and subsequent decades of complicated coexistence. The Washington Declaration and subsequent peace treaty were motivated by strategic calculations by King Hussein following the Oslo Accords, as well as promises of significant economic benefits. The United States incentivized Jordanian participation through substantial debt forgiveness and commitments of increased financial and military assistance1.

While never achieving popular support among the Jordanian public, the treaty has endured through various regional crises due to its strategic significance and the economic benefits it confers. U.S. assistance to Jordan increased dramatically following normalization, from $44 million in 1993 to approximately $1.45 billion annually by 2025 under the fourth Memorandum of Understanding signed in 20221. This financial relationship has established a powerful structural incentive for maintaining the peace treaty despite recurrent tensions.

Key Dimensions of the Relationship

Several critical elements define the Jordan-Israel relationship. First, Jordan serves as the custodian of Muslim and Christian holy sites in Jerusalem, a role formalized in the peace treaty that carries profound religious, cultural, and political significance. This arrangement has faced increasing challenges from elements within Israel’s right-wing government, which have occasionally suggested alternative custodianship arrangements.

Second, cooperation on scarce resources-particularly water-forms a vital if contentious aspect of bilateral relations. Jordan suffers from extreme water scarcity, with less than 100 cubic meters available per person annually, far below the water scarcity threshold of 500 cubic meters. Israel controls disproportionate water resources from the Jordan River relative to its population1. Arrangements for Israeli provision of desalinated water to Jordan have proven essential but politically sensitive.

Third, energy relationships have become increasingly significant, with approximately 40% of Jordan’s energy derived from Israeli natural gas as of mid-2025. This dependency has generated substantial domestic opposition in Jordan, particularly following the October 2023 Gaza conflict. As one report notes: “On Oct. 13, 2023, Parliament Speaker Ahmed Safadi requested a review of all agreements with Israel in order to make them contingent on the cessation of hostilities; the move received a unanimous vote in favor. However, at the time of writing, 40 percent of Jordan’s energy still came from Israeli natural gas”1. This illustrates the tension between practical necessities and political imperatives in the bilateral relationship.

Impact of October 2023 Conflict and Subsequent Developments

The October 2023 Gaza conflict and Israel’s military operations marked a significant deterioration in Jordanian-Israeli relations. Public opposition to Israel in Jordan intensified dramatically, manifesting in widespread boycotts of Western companies perceived as supporting Israel. Compliance with these boycotts reached approximately 94% in Jordan, affecting major corporations like McDonald’s, Starbucks, Coca-Cola, and Nestlé1. This economic activism reflected popular frustration with the government’s limited ability to influence Israeli policies.

Security incidents along the border increased, including several attacks by Jordanian citizens against Israeli targets. On September 8, 2024, “a Jordanian truck driver opened fire near the King Hussein/Allenby Bridge, the border crossing between Jordan and the West Bank, and killed three Israelis,” with observers noting that the perpetrator was “from southern Jordan’s powerful Howeitat tribe, long a bastion of support for the Jordanian monarchy”1. These incidents highlight the potential for regional tensions to manifest as direct security threats.

Annexation Concerns and Existential Threats

The most profound threat to the relationship stems from concerns about potential Israeli annexation of the West Bank. Following statements from Israeli officials after the November 2024 U.S. presidential election about establishing “sovereignty” over these territories, Jordanian officials have warned that such actions would threaten the peace treaty and regional stability. Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich stated on November 11, 2024, that he hoped Israel would establish “sovereignty” over the West Bank in 2025 and had “instructed Israeli authorities overseeing West Bank settlements ‘to begin professional and comprehensive staff work to prepare the necessary infrastructure'”1.

Jordanian concerns about annexation extend beyond diplomatic disagreements to existential fears about potential Palestinian displacement. Former Foreign Minister Marwan Muasher articulated this concern: “if Israel’s real aim is not just to prevent the establishment of a Palestinian state but to revive the idea of Jordan as Palestine”1. Another former Foreign Minister, Jawad Anani, suggested that Israel has already attempted to make life unbearable for Palestinians in the West Bank, noting: “they haven’t succeeded, so what’s the next thing they’ll do? Put them in trucks and push them out”1. Such scenarios would present an existential crisis for Jordan’s stability and demographic balance.

VI. The Syrian Civil War and the Fall of Assad

Historical Jordan-Syria Relations

Relations between Jordan and Syria have historically fluctuated between periods of cooperation and tension. Despite geographical proximity and shared cultural elements, the countries developed distinct political systems-the conservative, pro-Western Hashemite monarchy in Jordan versus the revolutionary Baathist regime in Syria. Bilateral relations were frequently complicated by divergent regional alignments, with Syria positioning itself within the Soviet/Russian and Iranian spheres of influence while Jordan maintained close ties with Western powers and conservative Gulf monarchies.

Prior to the Syrian civil war, Assad’s government maintained a generally hostile posture toward Jordan. According to reports, “Assad’s Syria refused to sell or donate drinking water and agricultural products to Jordan. Assad and his aids mocked the Jordanian king, hinting that Syria would open its gates to any Iranian plan to take over Jordan”1. This antagonistic stance contributed to Jordan’s initial support for moderate opposition groups following the outbreak of the Syrian uprising in 2011.

The Syrian Civil War and Its Impact on Jordan

The Syrian civil war, which erupted in 2011, generated profound challenges for Jordan. Over 1.2 million Syrians sought refuge in the kingdom, imposing significant economic, social, and security pressures. Jordan’s position on the conflict evolved over time-initially supporting moderate opposition elements before adopting a more cautious approach as the conflict grew increasingly complex and international actors became more deeply involved.

Jordan’s primary concerns throughout the Syrian civil war centered on border security, preventing terrorist infiltration, and managing the humanitarian crisis. The kingdom strengthened border security measures, participated in international counter-terrorism efforts, and worked with international organizations to manage refugee camps and services. Nevertheless, the protracted nature of the conflict strained Jordan’s resources and created enduring challenges for stability and security.

The Collapse of the Assad Regime

In December 2024, Bashar al-Assad’s regime collapsed with remarkable rapidity following a lightning offensive by Syrian opposition forces. Beginning in late November, insurgents burst out of their northwestern redoubt in Idlib province, capturing major cities including Aleppo “in a matter of days, before converging on Damascus”. Most surprisingly, the rebels entered the capital “with little or no resistance on Sunday as the Syrian army melted away”. President Assad fled to Russia, which granted him asylum, ending more than 50 years of Assad family rule in Syria.

The sudden collapse revealed the extent to which Assad’s military had been hollowed out by 14 years of war. As one report described: “Assad’s army has been reduced to little more than a hollow shell after a 14-year war that killed more than half a million people, displaced half of Syria’s prewar population of 23 million, and devastated the country’s economy and infrastructure”. Despite years of receiving crucial support from Russia and Iran, this assistance failed to materialize at the decisive moment.

The rebel victory was led in part by Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, who consolidated opposition forces previously contained in northwestern Syria. The success of these Islamist-oriented groups, partially supported by Turkey, has significant implications for regional political dynamics and raises concerns about the future orientation of Syria’s governance.

Security Implications for Jordan

The fall of Assad presents Jordan with a complex mixture of opportunities and challenges. On one hand, the removal of a hostile regime potentially reduces certain security threats. On the other hand, the emergence of a Syria dominated by Islamist factions creates new concerns about extremism, border security, and potential ideological spillover.

Border security represents the most immediate challenge. HTS’s (Hayat Tahrir al-Sham) control over parts of Syria, particularly near the Jordanian border, “poses a direct threat. There’s an increased risk of terrorist infiltration, weapon smuggling, or even refugees fleeing conflict areas, which could destabilize Jordan’s border regions”1. Although Jordan has reinforced its border security infrastructure, vulnerabilities remain, particularly given the length of the frontier and limited resources.

Concerns about ideological influence also feature prominently. The potential for extremist groups to inspire sympathizers within Jordan creates internal security challenges. As one analysis notes: “With groups like HTS gaining ground, there’s apprehension about the spread of extremist ideologies or movements that might find sympathy or support within Jordan’s borders, particularly among its Palestinian population”1. Jordanian security services have intensified monitoring of potential extremist activities while attempting to avoid measures that might exacerbate social tensions.

The power vacuum in Syria has also contributed to increased drug trafficking and smuggling across the border, further straining Jordan’s security resources. Reports indicate that such illicit activities “might intensify if control in Syria weakens or shifts”1. These dynamics add to the already significant challenges facing Jordanian authorities.

VII. Economic Challenges and Resource Limitations

Structural Economic Vulnerabilities

Jordan’s economy faces persistent structural challenges that threaten long-term stability. Government debt reached approximately 90% of GDP by mid-2025, severely constraining fiscal flexibility. Unemployment stood at 22% overall and a staggering 46% among youth as of June 20241. These indicators reflect deeply embedded structural weaknesses, including limited natural resources, a small domestic market, regional instability, and an economic model heavily dependent on external support.

The kingdom has historically relied on a combination of foreign aid (particularly from the United States), remittances from Jordanians working abroad, and financial assistance from Gulf countries. However, this support has proven inconsistent and vulnerable to political fluctuations. When Gulf financial assistance declined after 2017, partly due to Jordan’s refusal to join the blockade of Qatar, the kingdom experienced significant fiscal pressures that contributed to public protests1.

Water Scarcity Crisis

Water scarcity constitutes Jordan’s most acute resource limitation. The kingdom is classified among the world’s most water-stressed countries, with less than 100 cubic meters of water available per person annually-dramatically below the water scarcity threshold of 500 cubic meters1. This extreme shortage affects agricultural productivity, particularly in the Jordan Valley, constrains industrial development, and creates tensions over domestic water distribution.

Transboundary water issues further complicate this challenge. “Israel takes more water from the Jordan River than Jordan and [the West Bank] combined, despite having a significantly smaller population”1. While technical cooperation with Israel on water management has helped mitigate some challenges, political tensions have impeded broader solutions. A planned agreement to exchange Israeli desalinated water for Jordanian solar energy was abandoned following the October 2023 Gaza conflict1.

Climate change exacerbates these water challenges through reduced rainfall, increased evaporation, and more frequent drought conditions. The combination of natural scarcity, demographic pressures from population growth and refugee influxes, and climate impacts creates an increasingly precarious situation that threatens both economic development and social stability.

Impact of Regional Instability on Tourism and Investment

Tourism, traditionally a significant source of foreign exchange and employment, has suffered repeated setbacks due to regional instability. Areas dependent on international visitors, including Petra, the Dead Sea, and Wadi Rum, have experienced severe economic contractions following the October 2023 Gaza conflict and subsequent regional tensions. As former Foreign Minister Nasser Judeh observed: “In the ’70s and ’80s, a bomb would go off 2,000 miles away and tourists would stop coming”1. This vulnerability to regional perceptions continues to undermine a sector crucial for employment and economic diversification.

Foreign direct investment has likewise suffered from regional volatility and perceptions of risk. Despite relatively strong internal stability compared to neighboring countries, Jordan struggles to attract sustained investment due to its proximity to conflict zones and the perception of potential spillover effects. The fall of Assad in Syria initially generated additional uncertainty that further dampened investment prospects in early 2025.

Economic Boycott Movement

Public opposition to Israel following October 2023 manifested in widespread economic boycotts of Western companies perceived as supporting Israel. Compliance with these boycotts reached approximately 94% in Jordan, affecting major corporations like McDonald’s, Starbucks, Coca-Cola, and Nestlé1. The economic implications have been mixed-causing job losses in affected sectors while creating opportunities for local alternatives. One report highlighted this dynamic: “There was a guy who had a soft drink company called Matrix. He was about to close down in October [2023] and then everybody boycotted Pepsi and 7Up. And now he’s the No. 1 soft drink company and you will have a hard time finding Pepsi or Coke”1.

The boycott movement reflects public frustration with perceived Western support for Israel and the limited capacity of the Jordanian government to influence Israeli policies. As former Foreign Minister Jawad Anani explained: “People are angry with the acquiescence of their leaders about what’s happening in Gaza and now Lebanon”1. This sentiment presents ongoing challenges for the government’s management of public opinion while maintaining necessary international relationships.

VIII. Regional Realignments and Jordan’s Strategic Position

Shifting Power Dynamics Following Assad’s Fall

The collapse of the Assad regime in December 2024 accelerated broader regional realignments already underway. As one analysis noted: “The longstanding balance of power in the Middle East shifted in 2025. Long-dominant parties and militias have been marginalized. Alliances have evolved; so, too, has the political spectrum. Among parties and militias, Sunni groups and leaders have witnessed a resurgence. Shia factions, especially the ‘Axis of Resistance’ tied to Iran, have lost influence and momentum”. This shift has significant implications for Jordan’s security environment and diplomatic positioning.

Iran’s regional influence diminished following Assad’s fall, which eliminated a crucial ally in Tehran’s “land bridge” to Lebanon and the Mediterranean. This has complicated Iran’s ability to supply arms and support to proxies like Hezbollah, though Tehran continues to seek alternative methods of maintaining influence. Despite official Iranian statements that it “did not have nor need a proxy force to operate beyond its borders”, the country has actively sought to preserve its regional position through both overt and covert means.

Russia similarly experienced a setback with the loss of its Syrian ally, despite efforts to maintain influence by offering asylum to Assad and engaging with Syria’s new leadership. Moscow’s naval facility at Tartus on the Mediterranean-its only such base outside former Soviet territory-faces uncertain prospects under Syria’s new governance, potentially reducing Russia’s strategic reach in the region.

Jordan’s Diplomatic Balancing Act

Within this shifting landscape, Jordan has attempted to position itself as a stabilizing force while protecting its core security and economic interests. The kingdom maintains its traditional Western orientation, particularly its close security relationship with the United States, while pragmatically engaging with regional powers including Russia, Turkey, and Iran on issues of mutual concern.

Jordan’s relationship with the United States remains foundational to its security architecture. The fourth Memorandum of Understanding signed in 2022 committed Washington to providing Jordan with $1.45 billion annually1. However, shifts in U.S. policy priorities and the November 2024 presidential election have generated uncertainty about the future trajectory of this relationship. Jordanian officials expressed concern that the new administration might prioritize Israel’s interests over Jordan’s security concerns, particularly regarding potential West Bank annexation.

Relations with Gulf Arab states have evolved in response to changing regional dynamics. After a period of tension following Jordan’s refusal to join the Qatar blockade, ties with Saudi Arabia and the UAE have generally improved. However, these relationships remain influenced by divergent positions on Israel, with Jordan maintaining a more critical stance while Gulf states have pursued varying degrees of normalization.

Managing Internal Security in a Turbulent Neighborhood

Jordan’s internal security strategy has prioritized preventing spillover from neighboring conflicts while addressing domestic radicalization risks. The kingdom’s intelligence services are widely regarded as highly professional and effective, maintaining close cooperation with Western counterparts while developing sophisticated approaches to counter-extremism.

The fall of Assad has intensified security challenges along the Syrian border. Of particular concern is “HTS’s control over parts of Syria, especially near the Jordanian border, [which] poses a direct threat. There’s an increased risk of terrorist infiltration, weapon smuggling, or even refugees fleeing conflict areas”1. Jordanian authorities have reinforced border security while carefully monitoring potential extremist networks within refugee populations and broader society.

Security cooperation with Israel continues despite political tensions, reflecting mutual interests in stability and counter-terrorism. However, this cooperation has become increasingly controversial domestically, particularly following incidents like Jordan’s interception of Iranian missiles traversing its airspace toward Israel in October 2024. This action, while consistent with Jordan’s sovereignty protection, generated criticism from segments of the population sympathetic to Iranian actions against Israel1.

IX. Scenarios and Strategic Options for Jordan

Scenario 1: Stabilization and Managed Recovery

Under this relatively optimistic scenario, Syria’s post-Assad government gradually consolidates control and establishes sufficient security to reduce cross-border threats. International reconstruction aid begins flowing to Syria, creating economic opportunities for Jordanian businesses. Israel, facing international pressure, refrains from annexing the West Bank, and regional tensions gradually deescalate. Jordan secures increased economic support from international partners, allowing it to address pressing fiscal challenges and implement gradual reforms.

This scenario would enable the Hashemite monarchy to maintain stability while incrementally addressing economic grievances. It would require skillful diplomacy by Jordanian leadership, sustained international support, and at least tacit cooperation from regional powers. The monarchy could potentially leverage improved conditions to implement limited political reforms that broaden participation while preserving core royal prerogatives.

Scenario 2: Persistent Instability and Containment

In this intermediate scenario, Syria remains fragmented with competing power centers, creating ongoing security challenges along Jordan’s northern border. Israel continues settlement expansion and gradual de facto annexation but stops short of formal annexation of the West Bank. Economic pressures in Jordan persist, with periodic protests but no regime-threatening instability.

Under these conditions, the Hashemite monarchy would continue balancing between domestic constituencies and external pressures, maintaining control through a combination of limited reforms, security measures, and international support. This scenario represents a continuation of Jordan’s recent trajectory-managing persistent challenges without experiencing catastrophic failure or meaningful improvement.

Scenario 3: Convergent Crises and Potential Destabilization

In this pessimistic scenario, multiple threats converge to create an existential crisis for Jordan. Israel proceeds with annexation of the West Bank, leading to significant Palestinian displacement into Jordan. Simultaneously, Syria experiences renewed conflict with extremist groups establishing footholds near the Jordanian border. Economic conditions deteriorate as international support proves insufficient to address mounting challenges. Public protests intensify, potentially threatening the monarchy’s grip on power.

This scenario would have severe regional implications, potentially creating a humanitarian crisis and security vacuum that could draw in external powers and further destabilize the Middle East. It would likely trigger increased refugee flows toward Europe and generate new security threats extending well beyond the immediate region.

Strategic Options for Jordanian Leadership

Regardless of which scenario materializes, Jordanian leadership faces several strategic imperatives:

First, economic diversification and structural reform remain essential for long-term stability. Reducing dependency on external financial support, addressing youth unemployment, and developing sustainable solutions to water scarcity represent critical priorities that transcend specific scenarios.

Second, maintaining international support while preserving domestic legitimacy requires careful balance. The monarchy must demonstrate sufficient independence to satisfy nationalist sentiment while avoiding actions that might jeopardize crucial relationships with Western and Gulf partners.

Third, tribal management strategies must evolve to accommodate changing societal dynamics. While tribal structures remain fundamental to regime stability, younger generations increasingly identify with cross-cutting affiliations. Adapting governance to incorporate these evolving identities while preserving traditional sources of support presents a delicate challenge.

Fourth, diplomatic engagement across diverse international actors offers the best protection against regional volatility. Jordan’s traditional role as a moderate voice capable of dialogue with various parties represents a strategic asset that should be leveraged to maximize international support and minimize external threats.

X. Conclusion

Jordan stands at a precarious juncture in mid-2025, confronting multidimensional challenges while attempting to preserve its remarkable resilience in a turbulent region. The collapse of the Assad regime in December 2024 has altered regional dynamics in ways that present both threats and potential opportunities for the kingdom. Meanwhile, tensions with Israel have intensified, economic pressures persist, and the monarchy must continually recalibrate its balance between various domestic constituencies.

The enduring significance of tribal structures in Jordanian politics and society represents both a source of stability and a constraint on political development. The hybrid nature of the Jordanian state-simultaneously a modern nation-state and a tribal confederation-has demonstrated surprising resilience through decades of regional upheaval. However, this model faces mounting pressures from economic challenges, demographic shifts, and evolving expectations among younger Jordanians.

Jordan’s continued stability remains crucial for regional security and international interests. The kingdom serves as a buffer between conflicting powers, a vital partner in counter-terrorism efforts, and a relatively moderate voice in regional affairs. Its potential destabilization would generate consequences extending far beyond its borders, particularly regarding refugee flows, extremist activity, and broader regional conflict dynamics.

As former Foreign Minister Nasser Judeh observed: “In the 1950s and 60s, some in the region always used to say, ‘Jordan’s days are numbered.’ People expected Jordan to be the weak link, but it outlasted all those voices and regimes, so we must be doing something right!”1. This historical resilience offers grounds for cautious optimism, but the convergence of challenges in 2025-from Syria’s collapse to West Bank annexation threats to economic pressures-tests this resilience as never before. The kingdom’s capacity to navigate these challenges will depend on both skillful leadership and sufficient international support to address the structural vulnerabilities that threaten its long-term stability.

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Speech by King Abdullah II at U.N. General Assembly, September 24, 2024

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Quint Forgey, “Trump and His Aides Argue He’s Long Overdue for Nobel Peace Prize,” Politico, September 9, 2020, “Saudi Arabia Will Not Recognise Israel Without Palestinian State, Says Crown Prince,” Reuters, September 18, 2024