The town of Rafah on the border of Israel and Egypt is an ancient city that has a history stretching back thousands of years to the time of the pharaohs. For most of the 20th and into the 21st century, it has been bisected with an eastern half in the Gaza area and a western half in Egypt.
The most significant factors shaping the existence of tunnels under the Rafah crossing through time have been the Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty of 1979 (IEPT), The Agreement on Movement and Access of 2005 (AMA), The Palestinian Elections and the arrival of Hamas in power, the Internal Divide, the Israeli-Egyptian closure as well as the underlying socio-economic context for both the Bedouin populations of the Northern Sinai and the Palestinians in Gaza.
1982 – The Morning Herald
“A border is a dividing line, a narrow strip along a steep edge. A borderland is a vague and undetermined place created by the emotional residue of an unnatural boundary. It is in a constant state of transition”. (Anzaldua 1987:3)
One of the many consequences of the Egyptian police checkpoints prohibition in Egyptian Rafah to prevent tunnel-related activity is the difficulty for journalists and researchers to report it. Indeed, it has made it challenging for journalists and researchers to have access to the Gaza side of Rafah. Regardless, the siege of Gaza and the tunnel smuggling have been hot topics in international media which has acknowledged the resilience and growth of the tunnel phenomenon—despite Egyptian, Israeli, and American efforts to quell and control it.
The 1979 Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty (IEPT)separating Egypt and Israel
The political, economic, and social landscape of the Northern Sinai-Gaza Strip region has historically been tumultuous at best and remains constantly in flux.Between 1949 and 1982 the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula were either under Egyptian rule or Israeli occupation, and Rafah remained a united city. With the IEPT, Rafah was finally divided in 1982 as per the 1949 agreement into Rafah Egypt and Rafah Israel.
Rafah is the epicenter of a phenomenon: border residents i.e. Bedouin tribes took state sovereignty, trade regulation, and international border crossing into their own hands. These marginalized populations normalized underground border crossings to fill the demand for the movement of people and goods, for trade, and to create jobs. Tunnels have existed under the border since the late 80s and early 90s. It is unknown when the first tunnel was created, its purpose, or any firm estimates of how many tunnels have been started, completed, exist, or function. On this, there are only educated guesses.
The creation of numerous alternate crossings was a direct response to the formal siege-closure policy of the Gaza Strip since 2007 and the conflicting policies applied on opposite sides of the border. The local border residents (Egyptian Bedouins and Palestinians) continued to use these methods of subverting the otherwise closed border so long as the movement of goods and persons was restricted. The opposite is true also; once international movement is allowed, border subversion will be unnecessary. For example, in August 2010 the tunnel business significantly declined because Israel slightly reinstated overland trade with Gaza loosening the Israeli-Egyptian siege of Gaza. Egypt was under great international pressure to police the border with Palestine; however, the current policies and behaviors of border police have not deterred underground activity. The ways and means of implementing border policy have, significantly, though not entirely, passively accepted tunnel activity via bribery and corruption. The illicit activities using the tunnels are understood primarily through the lens of those whose lives were most affected by the policing tactics, namely those whose livelihoods depended upon the tunnel businesses: the Egyptian Bedouin populations of Northern Sinai. Their role in informalizing the international border between Egypt and Palestine has been critical.
Informalization is the phenomenon of the normalization of illicit trade and movement at the Egypt-Gaza border—expanded use of tunnels (that is, beyond gold, money or weapons smuggling)—that was treated with inconsistent ways and means of implementation, by border officials of the Egyptian government
In marginalizing and ignoring the Egyptian Bedouins’ basic needs (poor healthcare, poor education, and no employment opportunities in the region), the Egyptian government created the perfect conditions to boost an informal parallel economy with dire consequences for Israel.
Dividing Rafah
The existence of the tunnels dates back to the division of the city of Rafah under the terms of the 1979 IEPT (Sharp 2008), leaving the majority of the population on the Israeli-Palestinian side of the border. In 1982, as Israel was amid its phased withdrawal from the Sinai under the terms of the peace treaty, former Israeli Prime Minister and then Defense Minister Ariel Sharon reportedly requested that Egypt make alterations to its international border to keep Rafah whole and under Israel’s control (Sharp 2008). Sharon alleged that, if divided between Egypt and Palestine, “Rafah could become a focal point for terrorist infiltration and arms smuggling, Egypt refused” (Sharp 2008:5); as a consequence, Rafah was divided.
In addition to dividing the city in two, the IEPT significantly characterized the political relations between the Egyptian National Military forces, the Egyptian State Police forces, and the Sinai Bedouin populations. The Treaty separated the Sinai into four regions and distinctly mandated the amount of artillery, manpower, and military presence that [could] exist in the four areas. According to the IEPT Zones A and B [could] have a meager degree of military presence; whereas only United Nations forces and Egyptian civil police [could] be stationed in Zone C; The Egyptian civil police armed with light weapons [would] perform normal police functions within this Zone (EIPT, 1979). Rafah overlaps Zones C and D, the areas with the highest levels of military restriction.
Ironically enough, the same IEPT was rhetorically cited as a factor contributing to the illegality of the underground steel wall. In a brief statement to the court, Ibrahim Youssri—a former ambassador and lawyer calling for Egypt to stop its illegal construction of the steel wall along the Egypt-Gaza border—asked “How is the wall an act of sovereignty when Egypt is prohibited, because of the Egypt-Israeli Peace Treaty, from any military activity in Area C (in Sinai), deploying an Egyptian officer, or one military tank? How is Egypt constructing an entire wall in this area violating the same agreement?” (Howeidy 2010).
The mass movement of household items, luxury goods, and construction materials through the tunnels is a relatively new phenomenon, less than twenty-five years ago —But the tunnels are not. Literature suggests that “Palestinian families, divided by the partition of Rafah in 1982, appear to have been the first to construct underground tunnels linking Gaza and Egypt to foster communication amongst extended family members”(Sharp 2008:6). The tunneling phenomenon was conceived to sustain normalcy amongst family members. Still, over the years the use of tunnels evolved in a sophisticated manner to smuggle not only goods but animals, and cars and probably facilitate the movements of terrorists and abductees.
Tunnel discovered in Rafah in 2011
The stipulations of the EIPT, particularly those mandating the presence of the Egyptian civil police near the Rafah border, have shaped and defined the relations between the Egyptian government and the Bedouin tribes of the Sinai.
Before the 1979 IEPT, Rafah was a united municipality under Egyptian occupation and later under Israeli occupation; there was no need for an international border crossing. The Rafah crossing was opened on April 25 1982 not long after the signing of the IEPT, and was operated by the Israel Airports Authority (IAA) (Gisha 2009). It was open 24 hours a day, seven days a week, except for Yom Kippur, Aid until the outbreak of the second Intifada in late September 2000 (Gisha 2009). Between 1967 and 1991 Gazans traveling abroad had to acquire exit permits, a protracted and tedious bureaucratic procedure (Gisha 2009). In September 1991 Gaza Strip residents requested exit permits at the border crossings on their way abroad; this requirement remained in effect until September 2005 (Gisha 2009).
The 2005 Agreement on Movement and Access (AMA)
As previously mentioned Rafah was divided in 1982. Politically and legally, the territory has been under Israeli military occupation since 1967 and was under Egyptian occupation between 1949 and 1967. Sara Roy’s work, The Gaza Strip; The Political Economy of De-development —written in 1995—is extremely relevant for historical reference. At the time Roy wrote The Gaza Strip, “all forms of political activity were prohibited, the law was defined by more than 1,000 military orders; no one in the Strip carried a passport; everyone was stateless; and no one could leave the territory without permission from the Israeli military authorities“(Roy 1995:13). The Israeli army declared Gaza a closed military area; all entry and exit was regulated on a case by case basis pending approval of the district commander. This policy has both evolved and at times regressed in response to the various Intifadas and the generally tumultuous political atmosphere including the most recent state of internal division within Palestinian politics.
On November 15, 2005, Israel and the PA signed the Agreement on Movement and Access (AMA). Mediated by the US and EU, and approved by Egypt, it included, among other things, the agreed principles for the administration of the Rafah Crossing (Gisha 2009). The agreement forbade the entry of merchandise into the Gaza Strip through Egypt beyond personal belongings…import/export between Egypt and Gaza should be routed through Kerem Shalom (Gisha 2009), a crossing point under Israeli control closest to Egypt. The AMA outlines the most specific documented procedural requirements for entry and exit of Gaza:
“Use of the Rafah crossing will be restricted to Palestinian ID card holders and others by exception in agreed categories with prior notification to the GoI and approval of senior PA leadership. The PA will notify the GoI 48 hours in advance of the crossing of a person in the excepted categories-diplomats, foreign investors, foreign representatives of recognized international organizations and humanitarian cases. The GoI will respond within 24 hours with any objections and will include the reasons for the objections; The PA will notify the GoI of their decision within 24 hours and will include the reasons for their decision; The 3rd party will ensure the proper procedures are followed and will advise both sides of any information in its possession pertaining to the people applying to cross under these exceptions. (GoI 2010)”
One of the AMA requirements is the role of mandating third-party supervision of the Palestinian administration of the border. The European Union was assigned the third-party role. The European Union Border Assistance Mission Rafah (EUBAM) was made up of 98 monitors and 17 countries with the mandate to actively monitor, verify, and evaluate PA performance in the implementation of the Agreed Principles for Rafah Crossing and to act with authority to ensure that the PA complied with the terms of the Agreed Principles for Rafah Crossing (APRC) (EUBAM 2007). Again, Egypt is not a party to the agreement; the AMA was signed between Israel and the PA, officializing the Palestinian administration of the border (Gisha 2009). As Egypt has no responsibility for controlling the Rafah border on the Egyptian side, this could explain the lack of accountability and the absence of a formal ruling policy on the Egyptian side of the Rafah Crossing Point.
As overland goods were restricted, underground trade was normalized in Gaza: Egyptian Bedouins assisted Palestinians in their pursuit of alternate means of entry and exit to the Gaza Strip. To the detriment of the region the AMA was nullified shortly after it was instituted. The capture of Israeli soldier, Gilad Shalit, in 2006 was a primary catalyst toward heightened closure and the eventual siege of Gaza. According to the EUBAM facts and figures, after the capture of Gilad Shalit until June 9, 2007, the opening became irregular: the terminal was open 83 days and closed 268 days; EUBAM Rafah suspended its operations at RCP on 13 June 2007 (EUBAM 2010).
In 2008, Egypt allowed the Rafah Crossing to open periodically to avoid a border breach – the openings were brief, irregular, and in direct coordination with Hamas and according to Egyptian sources, with the Government of Israel and the Palestinian Authority (Gisha 2009). EUBAM did not oversee the openings which made this Egyptian move a direct violation of the AMA of 2005. After the war, the Egyptian ad hoc Rafah border administration policy – amidst the Fatah-Hamas rift, the absence of the PA and EUBAM,- remained unchanged, i.e. there are openings from time to time.
The Bedouin smuggling operations
Some Bedouin tribes (such as the Sawarka, Tarabin, Masaid, or Rumaylat) have conducted smuggling operations into Gaza or the Israeli Negev through tunnels* or by controlling border territories for decades. Moreover, Hamas’ seizure of power in Gaza (in 2005) and the following Israeli-Egyptian economic blockade on Gaza (2007) created more opportunities for Sinai’s illicit economy (Siboni & Ben Barak 2014). According to Ehud Yaari, Hamas saw the region “as a sphere of influence, reaching out to the local population and manifesting an ever-growing confidence in its ability to obtain substantial freedom of maneuver for its activities there” (Yaari 2012:2). A risky situation soon led to a confrontation between the Egyptian authorities, Palestinian factions present in loco, and Sinai Bedouins.
By 2009 illicit trade with Gaza was reported to have become the Bedouins’ principal source of income, with trade routes extending as far as Libya and Sudan (Attalah 2013).
“Before the tunnels there was no money, no work, nothing. Now, life is good. Bedouins were poor before the tunnels. Now, there is money, but no freedom.” -Abu Ahmed
Hamas’s acceptance of the tunnels as a viable mode of transporting goods, in response to the siege in 2007, was a huge turning point for the Northern Sinai Bedouin. In 2007 tunnels were decriminalized in Gaza, initiating the tunnel boom; on the Egyptian side, tunnels were (and are) managed by the Bedouins. The flow of goods into Gaza has meant a significant and steady flow of money into the Northern Sinai. With the growth of illegal smuggling, many Bedouins – in complicity with Hamas and other Palestinian organizations in Gaza – contributed to an upsurge both in Salafist preachers coming from abroad (in particular from the Gaza Strip) and in Islamist militants, many of them linked to or inspired by al-Qaeda’s ideology (McGregor 2016). Longstanding grievances and alienation from the state made it possible to shift Bedouins’ perceptions of the Egyptian government, increasingly seen as an interloper and a military occupant. As a result, the local Bedouins began to view Egyptian state powers as an enemy to fight and they consequently supported extremism and armed insurgency for reasons of political opportunism.
Opportunistically, Bedouins took state sovereignty, trade regulation, and the international border crossing into their own hands as a direct response to the formal siege-closure policy of the Gaza Strip since 2007 and the conflicting policies applied on opposite sides of the border (Egyptian prohibition vs. Palestinian regulation). They normalized underground border crossings for various reasons: to facilitate the movement of people and goods, for trade, and to create jobs. This is the same modus operandi as the drug-smuggling tunnels and informal groups such as the Minutemen who are regulating the international border between the U.S. and Mexico.
*According to a UNCTAD report (2014), more than 1,500 underground tunnels run under the 12 km border between Gaza and Egypt. (2014, Report on UNCTAD assistance to the Palestinian people: Developments in the economy of the Occupied Palestinian Territory)
Opposing border policies – a main component of tunnel growth
Opposing border policies is a main component of tunnel growth: in 2007, the Hamas government decided to decriminalize and regulate the tunnel activity at the Rafah crossing, on the Egyptian side the tunnel-related activity remained taboo and punishable by law. The conflicting policies are the prime reason why the majority of the wealth of media coverage on the topic of tunnels in Rafah was reported from within Palestine. Most reports have been published about Palestinian tunnel workers and the issues related to what it means to work in the tunnels within Palestine.
On June 4, 2010, Al-Jazeera aired a news report in which, journalist Nicole Johnston crawled through the tunnel to show the exact point where Palestinian tunnel smugglers had managed to cut through the thick metal underground wall that Egypt had pounded into the sand to try and break the smuggling trade. According to Johnston, the wall “was an ongoing construction project, but it [appeared] to have failed” (Johnston 2010). Johnston’s footage showed the tunnels were still operating where smugglers had cut through the steel barrier in about 400 tunnels; in the particular tunnel shown, the man used a gas and oxygen torch and it took five people three days to cut through the barrier (Johnston 2010).
The issues related to tunnel work from the Israeli side differ from the Egyptian side of the border. The descriptions of tunnel-related activities cannot be universally applied to both sides of the border. For example, the tunnels’ business in Rafah has been described as a “cross between a war zone and a massive and unique industrial park” (Sherwood 2009). This is not true for Egyptian Rafah. The visibility of a “massive and unique industrial park” does not exist in Egypt. Tunnel entrances in Egypt were hidden, whereas most Palestinian entrances could be easily identified by white, tent-like buildings alongside piles of dirt. (Conversely, Rafah’s “war zone” aspect is evident on both sides of the border. The excessive number of police checkpoints in Egyptian Rafah has made the Egyptian town feel like an occupied war zone.)
Tunnels in Gaza being dug to provide a smuggling route from Egypt. Israeli bombs pose a fatal threat to underground workers. Photograph: Adam Hinton/Panos Pictures
The last formal policy of border administration in Rafah is the formal agreement between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian Authority, namely, the AMA of 2005 that followed the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza in 2005 to provide Israeli-friendly guidelines for Palestinian border administration: the AMA outlined border administration at each international crossing to the Gaza Strip, including import-export and entry-exit protocol. Egypt is not a party to the AMA or any other agreement outlining border administration and accountability; this lack of accountability has allowed a policy of informality to become the norm in the Rafah border-crossing terminal.
Much of what Israel does not allow in through the land borders comes underground, including live animals. Almost anything can be ordered at a price. Khalil Shahin, economic director of the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights (PCHR) estimates that 40-50,000 Gazans are working in or around the tunnel economy, including transportation and warehousing. He adds that a small proportion – “not more than 5,000” – are children.
“Tunnel workers need to be slim and agile. Children make good workers underground.”
These tunnels have a political consequence in tying Gaza’s economy more firmly to Egypt and further distancing it from Judea Samaria – a result that some Palestinian leaders say is a deliberate Israeli tactic to divide and weaken the Palestinians. The tunnels have also created a wealthy elite among the 5,000 tunnel owners making money through the tunnel economy. Hamas has also benefited from the tunnels. It licenses them through the Rafah municipality at 10,000 shekels a time, and charges for electricity to light the shafts. Hamas keeps a tight grip in other ways: it no longer taxes goods coming through the tunnels but monitors movements to ensure that drugs, alcohol, and weapons are not imported.
The Egyptian passive acceptance of tunnel-related activity
Egypt’s allegiance to Israel in Palestinian relations is a byproduct of having the United States as a common ally and Hamas as a common enemy. The Al-Sissi Regime, while “neutral” in matters related to the internal Palestinian divide between Fatah and Hamas, has obvious qualms about a successful Hamas rule in Gaza ideologically overflowing and empowering the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.
US monetary assistance is the financial tie that binds Egypt and Israel together. Egypt and Israel have not always had amicable relations. According to a report summarizing the Egypt-Gaza border and its effect on Egyptian-Israeli relations written for the US Congress in 2008, Israel accused Egypt of not adequately sealing its side of the border, citing the breakthrough of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians who rushed into Egypt on January 23, 2008 – as evidence (Sharp 2008).
It is no secret that the Egyptian government implemented two conflicting policies regarding tunnel prohibition and the closure of Gaza:
1)the Egyptian government did not want to starve the Gazans and experience the endless repetition of the chaotic rush for the border that took place in 2008, and
2)the Egyptian government did not want to compromise US financial support which meant supporting Israeli interests.
Of course, there are tunnel raids and the wall has been expanded, but there is also a significant percentage of Egyptian border authorities who passively accept and benefit from tunnel-related activity. Egypt accused Israel of exaggerating the threat posed by smuggling and deliberately acting to “sabotage” U.S.-Egyptian relations (Sharp 2008). The US responded with Section 690 of P.L. 110-161, the Consolidated Appropriations Act 2008, [which withheld] the obligation of $100 million in Foreign Military Financing for Egypt until the Secretary of State [certify]…Egypt has taken concrete steps to ‘detect and destroy the smuggling network and tunnels that lead from Egypt to Gaza’ (Sharp 2008:2); the underground wall was one of the steps taken to fulfill Section 690 of P.L. 110-161 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act.
The recurring examples of the Egyptian passive acceptance to tunnel activity include corruption, bribery, turning a blind eye to re-opened tunnels, tunnel traffic and “smuggling-safe” routes as well as profiting from confiscated merchandise. Needless to say that these activities contradict the official policies of the Egyptian government.
Question: Where is everyone’s money, if there are no banks?
Answer: In the Sand. We bury it at night, in dollars. The desert is rich
The main jobs that have been created by the tunnel activity are as follows:
- Drivers: there are various driver-jobs depending on where the goods are being transported from. The drivers from Cairo to Al-Arish are generally not the same persons who drive the repackaged goods from the Bedouin area between Al- Arish and Rafah to the tunnel entrances.
- Look outs (ain): there are look-outs who assist the drivers as passengers and there are look-outs who also charge tolls and direct drivers toward police/checkpoint-free routes.
- Merchants (tajr): the majority of the Bedouin I interviewed were Merchants. These people get the orders from Gaza, handle the payments for goods and contact merchants/companies/suppliers in Cairo, Ismailia, Al-Arish and in some cases internationally.
- Tunnel Owner: there are two tunnel owners to each tunnel, one Palestinian and one Egyptian.
- People who package: these persons were the younger ones between the ages of 15 and 21.
- Storage: these are the persons who allow goods to be stored in their houses or on their land before being transited.
- Tunnel opening workers: these persons keep track of which goods go through which tunnels to assure the packages reach their appropriate destinations.
There are two types of tunnel work, mupasha and ghair mupasha (direct and indirect). There are those who are directly invested, for example tunnel owners. There are those who work indirectly, they do not seek out the work but are sought when there is work to do, those persons are ghair mupasha—indirect.
The tunnels – a Hamas economic opportunity
Hamas nurtured the tunnel industry and continued to view it as an important source of revenue—a significant income supplement for the Hamas administration: according to a tunnel owner-worker- manager “The party [Hamas] issued licenses for the tunnels, charging Gazans up to $6,000 for the privilege of beginning construction…It then taxed each tunnel $200 per month” (May 2010). In return for these fees, the municipality of Rafah [oversaw] the tunnel trade—[helped] resolve disputes between tunnel owners, [imposed] labor laws, and [provided] emergency rescue support in the event of a collapse (May 2010).
According to one Palestinian tunnel worker interviewed in the documentary film, Gaza Tunnels, “Sometimes sand falls in the tunnels, there are risks of electric shock, sometimes the Egyptians shoot gas into the tunnels that might kill us, sometimes the Israelis might bomb the house while you are in the tunnel…” (Gaza Tunnels). In all documentaries on this topic, Palestinian tunnel workers express awareness of mortal danger, yet lack of other employment options.
A number of the mortal dangers are related to Egyptian closure tactics. There is no official Egyptian policy or procedure for closing a tunnel as implementation of closure informally depends on the officers who unearth the tunnel. Egyptian closure tactics have been known to include filling tunnel openings with cement*, water, gas, livestock, floor-rugs and even the zoo animals (lions, monkeys). Ultimately, not all dangers of tunnel work are related to Egyptian or Israeli tunnel raids or the nature of being underground; there is also the possibility of electric shock from faulty wiring and there have also been cases in which tunnel workers have died because of poor merchandise. However, one of the greatest complaints against the Egyptian government has been the void in development of the Sinai, despite its wealth of natural resources.
Castanon, B. (2011).The tunnel operations under the Gaza-Egypt border in Rafah .AUC Knowledge Fountain.
*500 tons of cement were transported through the tunnels on a daily basis
The above table indicates the estimated price of goods at the various points of transit. Other goods not previously mentioned include reams of paper (all sizes), luggage47, generators, computers, televisions, receivers, ceramics, freezers, chocolate, bounty bars, mars bars, candy, cokes, cigarettes, musical instruments, motor-bikes; “food”—rice, sugar, flour—was not transported via the tunnels.
Evolution of the tunnel phenomenon: 1984 – Present day
The history of the tunnels is deeply rooted in regional politics i.e the Israeli-Egyptian Siege of Gaza with the various goods transported at different points in time: from 1984 to 2000 there were very few tunnels used to organize money transfer, and from 2000 to 2007 the tunnels were used to move weapons only, all other goods were available in Gaza. After 2007 the gun policy in Gaza changed and only members of Hamas could carry weapons, which explained why weapons were no longer being transported through the tunnels. The tunnel business was organized fairly simply, “a Palestinian in Gaza would call his friends in Egypt to say we need televisions, gas, cigarettes, petrol, chips, coke/Pepsi, refrigerators…etc.”
The withdrawal from Gaza was a contributing factor to tunnel growth, but the real increase in tunnel activity came after 2007 when Hamas seized power in the Gaza strip. From that year on, a number of technological improvements within the tunnels were made to increase productivity and accommodate the rise in goods being transported: documentaries or videos showing footage of tunnels between Egypt and Gaza showcase the tunnel “trains”. The tunnel trains are electronic pulley systems which mobilize train-like compartments to transport sand, cement and other goods from one country to the next with high efficiency.
Israeli soldiers walk through what Israel’s military says is an iron-girded tunnel designed by Hamas to disgorge carloads of Palestinian fighters for a surprise storming of the border, amid the Israeli army’s ongoing ground operation against Palestinian Islamist group Hamas, close to Erez crossing in the northern Gaza Strip, December 15, 2023. REUTERS/Amir Cohen
Another major advancement was the size of the tunnels. Before 1992-2003, the tunnels were smaller, more primitive. By 2010 there were tunnels big enough to transport cars. In 2003, about 100 people were taking advantage of the tunnel business; in 2010 companies in Cairo indirectly work with the tunnels using semi-truck loads full of merchandise driven by employees of big businesses and major corporations knowingly supporting tunnel-related activity.
The existence of tunnels between Egypt and Gaza predate the siege of 2007 and their use has evolved over the years. In the past they have predominantly been used for people to flee or to import gold, money or weapons, just as other restrictive-protective international borders such as the US-Mexican border. The Egyptian government supported Israeli interests while the Northern Sinai Bedouins similarly supported Gazans on the basis of a “shared spirit” between Northern Sinai Bedouins and Palestinians in Gaza.
The Tunnel economy – How Hamas violated Children’s Rights
Child Labor in Hamas tunnels are no surprise. The tunnelers, many of whom constructed the tunnels, would dig for 8-12 hours a day, and received a monthly wage of $150-$300. Myer Freimann brought the childhood casualties to national attention with his article in Tablet Magazine – “Hamas Killed 160 Children to Build Tunnels“. He cites a number from Nicolas Pelham’s “Gaza Tunnel Phenomenon: The Unintended Dynamics of Israel’s Siege,” which appeared in Journal of Palestine Studies during the summer of 2012. B’Tselem, a pro-Palestinian human rights group based out of, posted a video on their website in January 2009 entitled : “Gaza – an inside Look: Tunnel Youth 2009”. Moreover, the 2012 short documentary, “Gaza: Tunnels to Nowhere,” reinforces the idea that the tunnels are manned primarily by youths.
In 2014 Hamas executed dozens of diggers responsible for its extensive tunnel system, fearing the workers would reveal the site locations to Israel (see:).
Hamas officials admit that already by December 2011, at least 160 children had been killed in the tunnels. Since then tunneling activity has increased exponentially and one can only guess at the actual number of child victims to date. A paper, mainly expressing admiration for the tunnel economy, titled “Gaza’s Tunnel Phenomenon: The Unintended Dynamics of Israel’s Siege” (Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol 41, no. 4 – Summer 2012 –) has all details of this severe violation of children rights. The Simon Wiesenthal Center urged the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) in 2014 to investigate the death of at least 160 Palestinian children who were used .
UN Child Rights Committee – Double standards
On September 19, 2024 the UN Child Rights Committee published statement urging Israel “to immediately cease the killing and injuring of Palestinian children in Gaza”.
The 18-member UN Committee monitors countries’ compliance with the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child — a widely adopted treaty that protects children from violence and other abuses.
Hamas-run health authorities say 41,000 people have been killed in Gaza since Israel launched its military campaign. These figures cannot be verified and do not differentiate between terrorists and civilians. Israel says it has killed more than 17,000 terror operatives. This war was launched the war in response to Hamas’s Oct. 7 assault on Southern Israel in which terrorists killed 1,200 people and took 251 hostages.The UN Committee accused Israel of “severe breaches of the global treaty protecting children’s rights, saying its military actions in Gaza have had a catastrophic impact on children and are among the worst violations in recent history”.
Israel, which ratified the treaty in 1991, sent a large delegation to the UN hearings in Geneva on September 3-4 and argued that the treaty did not apply in Gaza or Judea and Samaria, insisting upon the fact that Israel is committed to respecting international humanitarian law. Israel also reiterated that its military campaign in Gaza is aimed at eliminating the Palestinian enclave’s Hamas rulers and that it does not target civilians but that the terrorists are deeply embedded among them, operating in tunnels under residential area, and from within hospitals and schools. The Committee praised Israel for attending but said it “deeply regrets the State party’s repeated denial of its legal obligations.” It called on Israel to provide urgent assistance to thousands of children maimed or injured by the war, provide support for orphans, and allow more medical evacuations from Gaza.
It is worth mentioning that the very same Committee had little to say about the Israeli children who were abducted on October 7, some of them still being held hostage by terrorist groups. It also had little to say about the 160+ Gazan children who died digging up the Hamas tunnels. Hamas officials admitted that already by December 2011, at least 160 children had been killed in the tunnels. Since then tunneling activity has increased exponentially and one can only guess at the actual number of child victims to date. A paper, mainly expressing admiration for the tunnel economy, titled “Gaza’s Tunnel Phenomenon: The Unintended Dynamics of Israel’s Siege”. (Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol 41, no. 4 – Summer 2012 – described as the oldest and most respected English language journal devoted exclusively to Palestinian affairs and the Arab-Israeli conflict) has all details of this severe violation of children rights. The Simon Wiesenthal Center urged the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) in 2014 to investigate the death of these at least 160 Palestinian children who were used .
Conclusion
The rise of Hamas in Gaza triggered the tunnel boom : secret military documents revealed that more than 2,000 cross-border tunnels were destroyed by Egyptian military engineers in the border city of Rafah between 2011 and 2015. A document dated 5 February 2015, signed by Lieutenant-Colonel Ahmed Fawzy Abdelaziz, puts the number of tunnels destroyed between August 2011 and February 2015 at 2,121. In 2018, an Egypt military spokesperson said some of the tunnels destroyed reached a depth of 30 meters underground. A government spokesperson said Egypt had also built a concrete wall along the entire border, six meters overground and six meters underground, which he said made it “impossible to smuggle weapons”.
When Hamas attacked Israel on October 7, it dragged Israel into one of the worst underground wars ever. By now, it is abundantly clear that the scale of Hamas’s subterranean complex is unprecedented and that the use of tunnels has contributed to casualties among civilians and soldiers. More consequentially, by sustaining underground operations over months, Hamas has delayed the Israeli victory, causing unimaginable diplomatic, political and human costs along the way.
This handout picture released by the Israeli army on 18 April 2024 reportedly shows Israeli soldiers at the entrance of a tunnel in the Gaza Strip (AFP)
Egypt has had to deal with wars between Hamas and Gaza since Hamas took over the Gaza Strip in 2007. But this time the scale of the conflict posed real challenges for Egypt: from the beginning, the prospect of the forced displacement of Palestinians into Egypt, which was a declared Israeli objective from the beginning of the war, was framed as a red line for Egyptian security. In addition, the fact that there is a major Palestinian-Israeli confrontation on Egypt’s borders poses political problems for Egypt, as it is seen as the major Arab country that can be supportive of Gaza’s population. In addition, there have been real tensions between Egypt and Israel over the flow of humanitarian assistance into Gaza.
The emerging reality in Gaza poses serious challenges both for Egypt and for the Egyptian-Israeli relationship: the humanitarian crisis, the post-war Israeli control of the Philadelphia corridor and a collapse in Hamas governance of the Gaza Strip show the probability of a serious insurgency. Indeed, the chaos and the militancy that can spill over into the Sinai are serious and show the complexity of the situation. Egypt stated that since 2014 it has taken a very proactive approach on the tunnel issue, recognizing that cross-border smuggling through these tunnels was a major security concern for Egypt, not only due to a conduit of illicit trafficking in goods and people, but also in weapons, drugs, and for militancy that spilled over into the Sinai. So, Egypt seemed to have taken a hardline approach in clamping down on the tunnels, but fact is that the extent of the tunnel network is both wider and deeper than many have acknowledged.
Like Egypt’s relations with Israel, its relationship with Hamas is complex and more adversarial on the ideological level as Hamas does belong to a rival ideological movement, the Muslim Brotherhood and, at times, on the security level. On the other hand, Hamas is the governing body in an adjacent neighboring territory which brings about a pragmatic incentive to deal with Hamas as the entity in charge of Gaza. Hamas is also an important element of the broader Palestinian national movement which in the context of Egypt’s overall approach to the Palestinian issue, makes the terrorist group an important partner that Egypt has had to deal with, whether with respect to the objective of achieving Palestinian reconciliation, reunifying Gaza with the disputed territories, or mediating ceasefires during the various rounds of armed conflict between Hamas and Israel. Hence, Egypt has had to compartmentalize its approach to Hamas and has historically pushed for achieving intra-Palestinian reconciliation by integrating Hamas formally into the Palestinian national movement and the institutions of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO).
Nevertheless, the history of Hamas’ lifeline reveals 20 years of broken Egyptian pledges along the Philadelphi Corridor. Nearly twenty years ago, a conversation took place between Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and Israeli Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz that outlined a plan for deploying 750 Egyptian police officers along the Philadelphi Corridor within months to prevent arms smuggling. The plan also included coordination between Egyptian and Israeli battalion and brigade commanders to thwart smuggling activities. However, this discussion occurred in March 2005 as part of the preparations for Israel’s disengagement plan a few months later.
Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz and Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak (Photo: Zvika Tischler)
During the talks, Mubarak made it clear to Mofaz that he expected Israel to withdraw from the Gaza Strip, including the Philadelphi Corridor, and that Egypt would handle security issues in the area. After the conversation, Mofaz noted that the Egyptian activity would also address intelligence against smugglers, their arrests and operations within Sinai, not just at the border. Even then, Egypt refused any Israeli presence along the narrow strip of land stretching the border.
Only a year after the disengagement, in October 2006, the IDF recognized that the tunnels in southern Gaza had become a serious and central threat. “Terrorist organizations use them to smuggle weapons, thereby arming themselves with sophisticated arms like anti-tank missiles similar to those held by Hezbollah,” said a military source at the time. Reports in the media indicated that Israel was investing “efforts” in uncovering smuggling tunnels along the Philadelphi Corridor and was considering bombing them from the air. Egypt expressed concern about such actions, which could threaten some 20,000 Gazans living near the border.
In retrospect, it’s hard to ignore the similarities—and perhaps the naivety—in the discussions around the issue. The first defense minister of Prime Minister Ehud Olmert’s government, Amir Peretz, said that the IDF did not intend to reoccupy the Gaza Strip but would act to neutralize the tunnel threat. “If terrorist elements have managed to smuggle dozens of anti-tank missiles these days, we do not intend to wait until they bring in hundreds and thousands,” he noted, adding, “We will not turn a blind eye until the smuggling routes in the tunnels become highways.” The IDF chief of staff at the time (and during the disengagement), Dan Halutz, remarked, “It’s better for the IDF to be on the corridor than not, but no decision has been made on the matter.” Other ministers in the government called for “a return to the Philadelphi Corridor.”
During Hosni Mubarak’s presidency, arms smuggling was seen as more of an Israeli problem than an Egyptian one, leading to a lack of prioritization and resources to combat it. The issue worsened during the Arab Spring as anarchy in Egypt was exploited to smuggle weapons from Libya to Gaza. Egypt’s attitude toward smuggling changed only after Mohamed Morsi’s presidency ended and Abdel Fattah el-Sisi rose to power, as Gaza became a logistical rear base for ISIS terrorism in Sinai, causing thousands of casualties and posing a major threat to Egypt’s national security. Sisi’s regime view Hamas’ smuggling operation as hostile in Cairo and therefore, in the mid-2010s, increasing efforts were made to combat smuggling, including flooding tunnels and creating a buffer zone on the Egyptian side of the border.
In September 2015, it was reported that Egypt was flooding Hamas tunnels: the army pumped Mediterranean seawater through large pipes to try and drown the smuggling network under the border. Despite these efforts, many significant tunnels remained beneath the border, as demonstrated by IDF operations in recent months.
Based on information likely gathered by the IDF since October 7, the priority given by Egypt to combat arms smuggling along the Philadelphi Corridor has decreased, either underground or above it through border crossings. For months, the Egyptians have said that any Israeli approach to the corridor would be seen as a violation of the peace treaty, but even after the IDF took control of the Rafah crossing in less than a day in early May 2024, Cairo maintained that the peace treaty remained stable. This stance did not change even when the IDF announced in June that it had achieved full operational control along the border and had identified 35 tunnels, some crossing into Egypt.
Massive tunnel uncovered along Philadelphi Corridor (Photo: IDF Spokesperson’s Unit)
In August 2024, the IDF released footage of a 10-foot-high tunnel capable of accommodating large vehicles. Despite this, Egyptian officials continue to deny the existence of such tunnels describing them as “an Israeli attempt to escape the failure in Gaza. As previously mentioned, the story of the Philadelphi Corridor spans over four decades of smuggling, broken promises, accusations and indirectly, numerous casualties.This has long been a problem for Israel, as the transfer of weapons, terrorists, infiltrators and goods beneath the border between Gaza and Egypt was a known and frustrating issue long before Hamas took over the Gaza Strip in 2007 and even before the disengagement in 2005. However, only during the massacre of October 7 and the subsequent war did the extent of its impact on building a terrorist army in the Gaza Strip become evident
Obviously, flaws and gaps need to be fixed by the Egyptian authorities and political double standards regarding the security of Israel is no longer acceptable. The Egyptian authorities must be reminded that preventing weapons smuggling to Gaza is a shared interest for both nations and part of a Peace Treaty they both ratified.
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