Introduction
Ethiopia is grappling with deep political transitions and the legacies of recent conflicts. In the aftermath of the 2020–2022 wars – most notably the Tigray conflict – the federal government committed to both a National Dialogue and a comprehensive Transitional Justice (TJ) process.
These parallel initiatives aim to restore stability: the National Dialogue seeks broad consensus on governance, identity and coexistence, while transitional justice focuses on accountability, truth, reparations and institutional reform for past abuses. Both processes draw explicit support from the 2022 Pretoria Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA), which requires Ethiopia to create “a comprehensive, national and victim-centred mechanism” aligned with international human rights standards.
In April 2024, Ethiopia’s Council of Ministers formally adopted its first National Transitional Justice Policy, crystallizing government commitments to address past violations (through criminal accountability, truth‐seeking, conditional amnesties, reparations and reforms) in accordance with both the CoHA and the African Union’s framework. At the same time, an Ethiopian National Dialogue Commission has been conducting nationwide consultations to compile a dialogue agenda, with initial phases reportedly completed in hundreds of districts.
This article examines how these two processes – transitional justice and national dialogue – can both reinforce and strain each other’s objectives. It reviews relevant theories and obligations, outlines each process’s status, and identifies points of complementarity and tension. The discussion highlights recent policy developments (the 2024 TJ policy, the 2022 CoHA), the role of institutions like the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission (EHRC) and the UN Human Rights Office, the centrality of victims and public consultation, and concerns about sequencing, political attention, capacity and trust. Ultimately, we argue that while potential conflicts exist, careful coordination can allow Ethiopia’s transitional justice and national dialogue to progress in tandem toward lasting peace.
Theoretical Framework
Transitional justice refers to the set of measures – including prosecutions, truth-seeking, reparations and reforms – used to address legacies of mass atrocities or human rights abuses, and is grounded in international legal obligations (e.g. prohibition of impunity). It is victim‐centred by design: international norms emphasize that survivors of gross violations have a right to acknowledgment, justice and reparation. The National Dialogue, by contrast, is a broad consultative process where diverse groups negotiate about core national issues (such as governance structures, ethnic relations and identity). Dialogues do not inherently deliver criminal accountability, but they can create political consensus and social stability, which some argue set the stage for broader reconciliation. In Ethiopia’s context, the CoHA and UN reports explicitly link both: for example, the CoHA urges a national, victim-centred TJ mechanism consistent with international law. Thus, theoretically, TJ and ND can be seen as complementary pillars of peacebuilding – one addressing grievances through justice and reform, the other forging political agreement and social healing. However, they also compete for resources, public attention and timing. This framework suggests that while both processes ultimately seek a non‐violent transition and “breaking the cycle of violence,” their mandates overlap (e.g. truth-telling appears in both) and must be carefully synchronized through strategic alignment rather than pitting one above the other.
Process Overview
Transitional Justice Initiatives
Ethiopia’s push for transitional justice dates back to before the Tigray war, but conflict escalations made it urgent. In November 2021, the EHRC and the UN Human Rights Office issued a joint report on Tigray that explicitly recommended a holistic, human‐rights-based, victim-centred transitional justice policy. The 2022 Pretoria CoHA incorporated this, requiring a comprehensive TJ framework consistent with the African Union policy. In response, the federal Ministry of Justice convened a Transitional Justice Working Group of Experts and produced a Green Paper (post-2022) outlining public demands and international obligations. By April 2024, after limited validation workshops, Ethiopia’s Council of Ministers approved the country’s first National Transitional Justice Policy. This policy commits to address both contemporary and historical abuses through a suite of measures (accountability, truth, reparations, etc.). Following the policy, a roadmap was adopted (June–July 2024) to translate it into law. Draft bills were prepared to establish specialized bodies: a Truth and Social Cohesion Commission, Special Prosecution Office and Bench, an Institutional Reform Commission, and a Vetting Commission. Importantly, the roadmap envisions a coordinating institution to manage sequencing and synergy among TJ components, directly addressing earlier concerns about fragmented efforts. The Ministry of Justice also initiated public consultations on TJ draft laws, and in late 2023–early 2024 the EHRC (with UN support) held 15 community workshops with over 800 participants (displaced people, victims, community leaders, etc.) to gather victims’ perspectives.
National Dialogue Process
In parallel, the federal government has launched a National Dialogue process intended to tackle long‐standing political and social issues. The Ethiopian National Dialogue Commission (ENDC) was formalized to gather agenda items from every region. Throughout 2023 and 2024, the ENDC conducted broad consultations: by late 2024 it reported completing agenda‐gathering in 615 districts across all nine regions and two city administrations. These consultations included federal institutions, political parties, civil society, traditional/religious leaders, diaspora and others. The Commission’s chief, Prof. Mesfin Araya, briefed parliament on these achievements (late 2024) and noted that representative selection for the dialogue conference was underway. However, the security situation has complicated outreach. In some areas (e.g. Tigray, conflict zones in Amhara and Oromia), insecurity, displacement and opposition boycotts have hindered participation. The ENDC’s initial deadline (early 2025) has already been extended to February 2026, reflecting these challenges. The intended dialogue conference (to discuss fundamental issues like federalism, governance, identity, peace) is therefore not expected to conclude before 2026. As of mid-2024, only the preliminary “agenda-setting” phase was complete, with the substantive conference pending. Thus, both processes – TJ policy drafting and ND consultations – were officially underway by 2024, but neither had yet moved to their most consequential stages (enactment of laws or final dialogue outcomes).
Points of Tension
Despite shared goals, the coexistence of the TJ and ND processes has generated friction. From the outset, some stakeholders feared competition between them. Observers noted that transitional justice actors worried the National Dialogue would monopolize limited political and institutional attention. Conversely, national dialogue proponents viewed an assertive TJ agenda as potentially polarizing. They argued that pursuing accountability and prosecutions before consensus-building could undermine peace talks, suggesting that TJ should wait as a “downstream” step after dialogue. Rumors quickly circulated that the government had effectively put TJ “on hold” until the ND concluded. Indeed, a planned public consultation on draft TJ laws (slated for early 2024) was indefinitely postponed, fueling speculation that resources and focus had shifted to the dialogue.
Institutional coordination has been a core challenge. Ethiopia has not yet established a robust mechanism to align the two initiatives. For example, a Transitional Justice Institutional Coordination Mechanism (TICM) – envisioned to manage mandates and avoid overlaps – was not set up in time. Without clear roles, tasks like truth-seeking and reconciliation appear in both agendas. Both processes may seek to reconstruct historical narratives and address structural grievances. This overlap “has been suggested to contribute to tension”: without a coordinating framework, there is risk of duplication and public fatigue from repeated consultations on similar issues. In practice, some fear that victims and citizens will be asked twice about many of the same problems, while also dealing with lingering insecurity.
Security challenges have also strained both initiatives. Ongoing conflict in parts of Amhara and Oromia, and instability in Tigray (despite the 2022 ceasefire), have diverted government attention and resources. In conflict zones, both ND outreach and any future TJ activities (such as victim identification or truth‐telling forums) are difficult. Indeed, the ISS analysis notes that if active peace negotiations arise (e.g. in Amhara or Oromia), it might be “pragmatic” to temporarily defer justice initiatives during active hostilities – and similarly, dialogue efforts might stall amid violence. Internally, capacity constraints loom large: Ethiopia’s justice institutions are already overtaxed by daily workloads and emergency responses. Some experts argue that sequencing one process behind the other could overburden the state apparatus and dilute focus. Finally, these tensions have fueled public skepticism. Many citizens and observers worry that if the government appears to prioritize dialogue while postponing tangible justice measures, trust will erode. This echoes a broader concern: suspicions that transitional justice is being “manipulated by the government for political ends” can deepen if the government’s commitment seems to waver.
Complementarity
Despite these frictions, there are strong arguments that transitional justice and national dialogue can reinforce each other if properly aligned. By design, each process addresses different aspects of the political transition. The National Dialogue’s consensus-building could create a stable environment in which transitional justice measures are more acceptable. As one analyst notes, “in a deeply polarized country, transitional justice could benefit from [the] consensus-building that comes through national dialogue”. For instance, a broad dialogue may help to diffuse ethnic tensions and identify the most contentious issues (land, identity, autonomy) that must be considered in any justice policy. At the same time, a credible TJ process can undergird the dialogue by proving that the government is serious about redressing victims’ grievances and preventing impunity. The OHCHR/EHRC consultation report reflects this complementarity from the victims’ view: participants overwhelmingly agreed that accountability, truth-seeking, reparations and non-recurrence measures should all proceed equally, as essential pillars of a lasting solution. They saw criminal justice and truth-telling as necessary to “break the cycle of violence,” but also emphasized that dialogue on peaceful conflict resolution (including the safe return of displaced people) was needed for reconciliation. In other words, victims expect both justice and social cohesion processes to go hand-in-hand.
Institutionally, the new TJ policy itself foresees synergies. The legislation envisages creating a Truth and Social Cohesion Commission, a body whose mandate overlaps thematically with topics of the national dialogue (e.g. historical inquiries, social reconciliation). If well designed, such a commission could serve as a bridge: for example, it might channel findings from dialogue forums into truth-commission work, or use its research to inform dialogue agendas. Globally, peacebuilding models show that TJ and dialogue need not follow a fixed order. In some countries, truth commissions have followed a broad forum (e.g. Solomon Islands), while in others dialogue preceded justice (e.g. South Africa), and in yet others they proceeded in tandem. The key is strategic alignment: clarifying how each body’s mandate complements the other rather than duplicating it. A constructive overlap is possible. For example, both processes examine root causes of violence and competing historical narratives. If coordinated, they could reinforce a common narrative of past wrongdoing and future unity. As the ISS analysis concludes, the goal should be to have each process “reinforcing rather than undermining one another”, with neither process serving merely as a precondition for the other.
Sequencing and Implications of Delays
The timing and sequence of TJ and ND activities have become a point of debate. Currently, national dialogue consultations are well underway, while the transitional justice process remains largely preparatory. Many experts caution that indefinite postponement of TJ would send the wrong message. Delaying justice until after dialogue “incorrectly suggests that justice must wait for political consensus,” which risks deepening victims’ sense of neglect. Internationally, holding TJ hostage to the slower ND might reinforce narratives that the government lacks genuine commitment to accountability. Indeed, observers warn that domestic and foreign backers could lose faith if promised trials or reforms never materialize. From the victims’ standpoint, the need for justice is already well-documented: the CoHA, public opinion surveys and grassroots consultations all underscored robust demand for accountability and reparation prior to, or independent of, any dialogue outcomes. Any sustained delay could entrench a perception of impunity.
On the other hand, the argument for sequencing must be realistic. As of mid-2025, neither process has reached its substantive phase. ISS experts argue that a blanket moratorium on TJ activities is not necessary simply because ND has started. Transitional justice efforts (drafting laws, building institutions) could continue in the background, even while dialogue conferences proceed. For instance, preparatory work like legal reforms or war crimes codification can occur early, whereas actual prosecutions might be phased with the peace process. If any elements need temporary delay, it should be selective: e.g. trials in active conflict zones might wait until ceasefires hold, but truth commissions or vetting could move forward elsewhere. Crucially, any decision on sequencing must be official and transparent, to avoid rumors and preserve trust. Overall, experts emphasize there is no hard either/or choice: “Ethiopia doesn’t face an either/or dilemma,” since proceeding with TJ need not overwhelm capacity or distract from dialogue. Rather, careful coordination and clear sequencing of specific tasks can allow both processes to advance without negating each other.
Roles of Institutions and Public Engagement
Several institutions are central to both processes. The Ethiopian Human Rights Commission (EHRC) has been deeply involved in transitional justice: it co-led the 2021 Tigray inquiry and jointly organized the nationwide victims’ consultations. The EHRC thus channels victims’ voices into policy (for example, insisting on criminal accountability and non-amnesty clauses) and serves as a watchdog for legal rights. Similarly, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) has provided technical support and legitimacy – exemplified by its public endorsement of a victim-centred TJ policy and its publication of the joint report. The UNHCHR’s position reinforces Ethiopia’s international obligations (under human rights law and AU agreements) and pressures adherence to norms. Meanwhile, the National Dialogue Commission engages federal, regional and non-state actors to ensure inclusivity. Its very design – comprising representatives from all regions, parties, civil society and the diaspora – aims for broad buy-in.
Public consultation has been a key principle. The government held preliminary dialogues through the ND Commission, but also opened forums for commenting on TJ law drafts (though these were later delayed). Civic organizations have actively lobbied for a “transitional justice joint platform” to coordinate NGOs, and civil society actors have voiced both support and concern for these processes. Crucially, victims have signaled their needs: across multiple regions, Ethiopian victims stressed the importance of all TJ components (justice, truth, reparations) and demanded that institutions be independent and credible. These findings suggest that for legitimacy, any TJ or ND body must operate transparently and free from undue political influence – a point underscored by victims’ repeated call for impartial institutions.
The international community also has roles. Ethiopia’s obligations under international law (e.g. genocide and torture statutes) mean that ignoring serious crimes would violate treaties. The Joint EHRC–OHCHR report explicitly reminds Ethiopia of the “duty to investigate and prosecute gross human rights violations…including those which amount to crimes under international law,” and that victims “are entitled to justice…including adequate, prompt and effective reparations”. This global normative framework implies that neither internal political settlements (ND outcomes) nor amnesty bargains can fully supplant the requirements of justice. External partners (UN agencies, AU, donors) may thus pressure for the timely enactment of TJ laws and the protection of ND proceedings.
Addressing Trust, Capacity and Political Attention
Public trust is fragile. Reports of delays have already sparked skepticism that the government is “not fully committed” to transitional justice. Any hint that one process is being used to stall the other risks fueling conspiracy theories – for instance, that the government may want to avoid accountability by diluting it within a broad political consensus. Transparency is therefore vital. Both ND and TJ authorities should regularly update the public on progress, clarify how decisions are made, and commit to a clear timeline. Civic education campaigns can explain that even parallel work can be complementary, helping to mitigate misunderstandings.
Institutional capacity is another concern. Ethiopia’s judicial and governance structures suffered during conflict – courts are backlogged and some regions lack functional administration. There is a real risk that launching new TJ institutions (prosecution offices, special courts, vetting commissions) and a massive ND conference simultaneously could strain already-weakened systems. The ISS analysis reassures that transitional justice “does not overburden institutional capacity” if sequenced well, but this requires careful resource planning. In practice, international assistance (training judges, funding truth commissions) will be crucial. The government should also streamline overlapping tasks: for example, where ND regional teams are collecting grievances, they could share data with TJ preparatory teams to avoid duplication of field work.
Politically, the national leadership must balance its attention. The same top officials (including the Prime Minister) have publicly championed both processes. Ensuring neither is starved of high-level support is important. The president’s office or cabinet could set up an inter-ministerial committee (including Justice, Peace, Interior) to oversee both agendas. This might echo the roadmap’s vision of a coordinating body. Such a mechanism could arbitrate conflicts of priority: for instance, if a security crisis erupts, it could make an explicit decision on how much to pause each process without “collateral damage” to public confidence.
Finally, the political environment remains polarized. Some opposition parties and activists have been wary of the ND’s scope and independence. Their withdrawal from ND processes (cited in mid-2024) is a red flag: if key groups disengage, dialogue outcomes lose legitimacy, which in turn can undermine any restorative justice linked to those outcomes. To build trust, the government may need to make concessions (e.g. allowing more international observers or revising the ND proclamation for greater impartiality). Similarly, for TJ, survivors and minorities will only believe in its fairness if notable abuses (across all sides of conflict) are addressed.
Conclusion
Ethiopia’s efforts at transitional justice and national dialogue reflect a bold attempt to address decades of grievances while redefining its national consensus. These two processes need not be rivals; indeed, in principle they can complement one another, each reinforcing the foundations of a stable society. The key challenge is practical: ensuring they proceed in tandem without one undermining the other. Recent policies (the 2024 TJ framework and implementation roadmap) recognize this imperative by committing to victim-centred, holistic justice and by envisioning coordination mechanisms. At the same time, the unfolding experience shows how easy it is for well-meaning initiatives to clash. Delays in consultations or unclear sequencing can corrode trust and stall momentum. For Ethiopia to succeed, leaders must align these processes through inclusive dialogue, legal clarity and institutional creativity. By actively engaging victims, honoring international obligations, and transparently sequencing the tasks, Ethiopia can harness the power of both transitional justice and national dialogue as dual engines of peace. As experts emphasize, neither process should obstruct the other: when properly coordinated, each can amplify the other’s impact, steering the country toward lasting reconciliation and democratic renewal.
References
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Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights & Ethiopian Human Rights Commission. (2023, December 28). Ethiopia: Justice for past abuses must be victim-centred and include criminal prosecutions, reparations, truth-seeking and institutional reforms – UN report [Press release].
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Abebe, Z. B. (2024, April 2). As Ethiopia moves forward with its transitional justice initiative, challenges abound. International Peace Institute Global Observatory.
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Ministry of Justice. (2024, April 17). Press Release Regarding the Approval of the Ethiopian Transitional Justice Policy by the Council of Ministers.
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