Located along the border between Egypt and The Sudan, Bir Tawil (“tall water well” in Arabic) is the product of a border dispute that goes back over a century, the result of which is that neither country claims it, rendering the 1,290-square-kilometre territory Terra Nullius.
Several individuals, misreading the traditional legal ramifications of the designation Terra Nullius, have laid claim to it, though mostly as little more than publicity stunts. Since the discovery of gold in the area, and the extraction operations of the Canadian mining firm Orca Gold Inc. at its Block 14 concession just over the border in Sudan, the local prospectors fear they will lose their livelihood. These locals are primarily made up of members of the Ababda Tribe.
In February 2025, the Trump administration proposed post-war plan with the core idea of relocating Gazans to “take over” the Gaza Strip and transform it into “the Riviera of the Middle East.” During a press conference with Netanyahu, Trump pitched this relocation plan as a necessary step to clear the way for the U.S. to assume long-term control and redevelop the war-ravaged strip. He’s suggested relocating most of them to neighboring countries—primarily Egypt and Jordan, with vague nods to other “Arab lands.” Both Egypt and Jordan have explicitly and firmly rejected the idea of accepting displaced Palestinians from Gaza, with Egypt calling the displacement an injustice or a threat to national security and Jordan stating this was the red line not be crossed.
With both nations, i.e key U.S. allies receiving significant aid—$1.3 billion annually for Egypt, $1.5 billion for Jordan—and stucking to their refusal despite Trump’s hints at leveraging that aid, analysts have tried to find alternatives. Two weeks ago, I heard in an X-Space a “political analyst” talking about the Bir-Tawil triangle – citing Wikipedia as a trustful source -as a possible solution to the displacement of Gazans that is of course paramount to achieving effective post-war reconstruction of the Gaza Strip. Needless to say that his idea is not only ridiculous but is in breach of International law when it comes to protecting human rights of pastoralists in that region. Though requesting to come up as speaker, I wasn’t given the possibility – maybe the host and co-host did not see my request – to push back on that silly proposal. Hence this article that explains why this proposal is nonsense.
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The history of the Bir Tawil goes back to the British occupation of Egypt in 1882. Ostensibly a short-term solution to protect British monetary interests in the country, in reality, Britain wanted to control local trade, weaken the Ottoman Empire, and strengthen its position around the Suez Canal. Furthermore, the seizure kickstarted the Scramble for Africa.Then ensued a turbulent period throughout both the region and the British government, with imperial eyes turned towards other parts of Africa.Soon after the occupation, Lord Salisbury, losing support in debates over Home Rule, resigned.
This instability hurt the empire, as British forces in Egypt suffered multiple defeats to Islamic nationalists following the Mahdi in Sudan. The final blow was dealt at the Siege of Khartoum in 1885 and the defeat and death of General Charles Gordon, an imperial hero widely respected by the public. British troops withdrew from Sudan and would not return for a decade.
In 1896, Lord Salisbury, returning as Prime Minister, ordered a campaign to secure the source of the Nile and prevent other world powers from doing the same. The campaign was led by Herbert Kitchener who argued the occupation of Sudan was necessary to both protect Egypt and keep trade routes to India secure. During the Scramble for Africa, British forces marched quickly into Sudan before meeting with French forces at Fashoda. The resulting confrontation between the armies triggered a diplomatic incident that would lay out the division of East and West Northern Africa. The Battle of Omdurman in 1898 was the decisive victory against Mahdist forces, with Britain securing the region.
Herbert Kitchener, via Encyclopaedia Britannica
This newly conquered region would now need to be administered. Britain had become increasingly involved in Egypt, and Sudan was, for the moment, under the control of Egypt and had a “veiled protectorate” in place. The decision to divide the two was taken in 1899, a year after Kitchener’s conquest. The first attempt to redraw the boundaries followed a similar pattern to how European powers drew up the rest of Africa: with straight lines with little consideration for geographical, cultural, or ethnic differences. However, in a rare case of recognizing their own mistake, the British government quickly reversed its position and, in 1902, redrew the map along administrative lines instead. The dispute between Egypt and Sudan stems in fact from a discrepancy between an 1899 delineation of the border between both countries that traces a straight line from east to west to the Red Sea, and another administrative boundary drawn in 1902 which slips south-east to encompass Bir-Tawil, and then traces a jagged course back up, north-eastward, toward the coast. This gave Egypt control over the nomadic Abadba tribe, to which it had closer cultural links. Sudan was conversely given further access to the Red Sea and the Beja tribe, north of the original line.
Two newly created areas stood out when these two maps were laid over each other. South of the original border was the Bir Tawil, and to the north was the Hala’ib Triangle. The second border would remain in place for the time being. Direct British control over Sudan and de facto control in Egypt meant any issues were quickly resolved. It was only when they achieved their independence in the next century that problems would arise. Sudan’s independence in 1956 brought the issue of the border to a head again. Egypt recognized the 1899 border, whereas the newly formed Sudanese government opted for the redrawn 1902 boundary. This was because the Hala’ib Triangle was much more valuable, with valuable resources, access to the Red Sea, and a fixed population. In contrast, the Bir Tawil was mostly empty. It became clear that if either claimed the Bir Tawil, they lost their claim on the Triangle. The Bir Tawil therefore became terra nullius, unclaimed by any country, a “no man’s land” and is the only remaining territory on Earth (outside of Antarctica and a few small patches of land between Croatia and Serbia) that is truly terra nullius.
The first confrontation between the two countries came in 1958 when Sudan attempted to hold elections in the Triangle. Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser sent troops into the region in an attempt to boost nationalist fervor before a referendum on the unification of Egypt and Syria. After an international outcry, these troops quickly withdrew, and Sudan slowly built up its presence in the area, with the Hala’ib Triangle taking part in all Sudanese elections until the 1990s. However, both the Triangle and the Bir Tawil were under joint administrative control. With Sudan’s administrative power weakening around the turn of the century, Egypt managed to gain control of Hala’ib, pouring plenty of resources into the region.
A stalemate has emerged in the 21st century, as neither side has been able to press its claim fully. Egypt has retained de facto control, with its military blocking any Sudanese attempts to register voters. Furthermore, the Egyptian government has continuously moved its administrative posts further south in the Triangle, limiting access to materials coming to Sudan. These attempts to bureaucratically drain Sudanese influence out of the region have been largely successful, with little opposition from the United Nations or other African states. However, a key reason why Sudan will never fully leave the triangle is that the ethnic composition of Hala’ib is still much closer to that in Sudan. With the focus of both countries and the international community on the Hala’ib Triangle, the Bir Tawil remained largely forgotten. A lack of development and attention meant both sides ignored it in their quest to secure the more valuable Triangle and access to the East. The Bir Tawil therefore remains one of the only habitable places in the world unclaimed by any recognized state.
Into this void poured a litany of gentlemen adventurers and amateur explorers, each trying to make their own history and find a way to exploit the unclaimed territory.
Jeremiah Heaton, via Washington Post
The most notable was Southwest Virginian Jeremiah Heaton, who traveled to Bir Tawil in 2014 and planted his own flag in the region, claiming the territory as his own, naming it the “Kingdom of North Sudan.” The reason Heaton gave for his supposed conquest was so that he could make his seven-year-old daughter Emily an official princess as she had always dreamed. Heaton met with lots of praise from those enamored with the story; there was also significant criticism. The main point made was that Heaton’s justification for planting his flag was that since the land was supposedly empty, despite a nomadic presence in the region, was the same used by initial colonial powers in the 18th and 19th centuries.
Heaton’s claim was quickly struck down by the United Nations and the flag removed, but it didn’t stop others from attempting to make the same dangerous journey across the desert. Russians Dmitry Zhikharev and Mikhail Ronkainen raised their own flag over the region, with Indian businessman Suyash Dixit planting his own a few years later. Like Heaton’s attempt, these were quickly struck down, but the issue of the Bir Tawil still presents an interesting challenge for both legal scholars and international organizations.
Bir-Tawil, a terra nullius remained unclaimed
The Bir Tawil and Hala’ib Triangle appear to be a problem without a fast-approaching solution. The haphazard British drawing of the map left a problem that went unchecked for over fifty years while they administered both Egypt and Sudan as part of a broader African administration. New nationalist movements followed by independence brought the issue back to the fore, as leaderships of both Egypt and Sudan looked to strengthen their own rule, using attempts to seize the Triangle to rally their own populations.
The Hala’ib Triangle, via
It appears that Egypt has slowly been gaining control of the Hala’ib Triangle, given Sudan’s recent political struggles and increased focus on separatist movements in Darfur and South Sudan. But with the population of Hala’ib tied more closely to Sudan, this is unlikely to be well received. The Bir Tawil, therefore, still remains unclaimed; the strongest claim may belong to the nomadic tribes that dwell there. The Ababda tribe considers it their native homeland and are fiercely protective of it. And they are extremely far from receptive to people claiming their land
Who are the Ababda?
The Ababda people have had a presence there going back at least as far as the Roman Empire. They are an ancient people of Hamitic origin and are physically closer than any other African peoples to the ancient Egyptians. They are indigenous to Africa as opposed to many of their bedouin neighbors. The Ababda, as part of the Beja conglomerate of clans and tribes, may be the descendants of the peoples referred to as the Medjay during the Middle kingdom. Barnard (2009) and Hobbs (1990) point out that certain items of material culture widely employed by Beja peoples today show great similarity with those found in ancient Egyptian tombs, and that the Ababda tradition shows strong connections with the Beja cultures of other areas in Egypt, Sudan, Somalia and Ethiopia.
Their pastoral nomadic lifestyle is based on herding camels, goats and sheep in the wadi (desert valley) systems, and on trade in products such as the charcoal they produce on a small scale and the medicinal plants they collect.
As a nomadic people, the Ababda ethnic group are extremely knowledgeable about their desert surroundings and how to use whatever this harsh environment provides. They are famed for their hunting skill, their proficiency in animal husbandry, their craftsmanship, and their familiarity with the medicinal properties of desert flora. For this reason, they often found employment as guides, using their knowledge of the desert to help caravans make the arduous journey from the Nile to the Red Sea (Murray 1923; Starkey 2000; Bos-Seldenthuis 2007). The material culture of the Ababda nomads is meagre, as is often the case with migrating people, while in contrast their oral traditions and other expressions of intangible culture are vast.
Ababda people are divided into a number of tribes, which in turn are divided into clans. Two of the larger tribes are El-Gami’ab, which includes ten clans, and the El-Mohamed’ab. Traditionally, Ababda practice consensus-based governance and decision-making. Each clan has a leader, and leadership is passed on from father to son. Traditional community leaders are respected and their advice and guidance is sought, also by official government-appointed leaders. Traditional leaders sit in tribe councils and arbitrate any conflict between tribe members or with outsiders. They are representative of the interests of all. Feasts and weddings are used as occasions for the tribe and leaders to convene and deliberate. In addition to the major Muslim feasts, the Ababda also celebrate “mulids” – festivals commemorating revered sheikhs. These religious feasts are important occasions for members and leaders of the different tribes and clans to come together and consult on pressing issues or resolve conflicts.
Their pastoral nomadic lifestyle was dealt a particularly hard blow in the 1990s when tourism as an economic activity grew along the Red Sea coast, providing jobs and a more settled existence to many young Ababda men. At the same time, the government was building villages and attempting to push them into a more sedentary lifestyle. As a result, there is something of a generation gap that has developed between the older generation, who have known life in the desert, and the younger generation, which has chosen for various reasons to migrate to a more urban environment—an experience that attenuates desert skills and knowledge, and may cause this place specific expertise to eventually become lost (Wendrich 2003; Hamed et al. 2002). This ethnic group has avoided becoming assimilated into the larger Egyptian or Sudanese cultures. Indeed, they are characterized as having an intense in-group feeling and being suspicious of outsiders. They are proud of their indigenous African ancestry, but at the same time they sometimes attempt to link their culture (mostly through traditional stories of descent) to the Arabic peninsula in order to give their culture a more securely Islamic base. Although little anthropological research has been conducted on the subject, this may reflect their changing nomadic lifestyle in the past 150 years, and a wish to seek adhesion to the mainstream Egyptian culture.
Indigenous rights and International law
The people that operate the gold extraction operation in Bir Tawil are members of the Ashabab—one of the four dominant branches (tribes, or qaba’il) of the Ababda; the others being Fuqara‘ wa Milikab, al-Abudiyya wa Shanatir, and al-Jamaliyya. Murray (1923) presents a detailed genealogy of the succession of Ashabab Sheikhs up to the point at which he was writing (Murray 1923; Nielsen 2004). This part of the Nubian Desert has long been famous for its gold mining, as well as for the arduous nature of the endeavor. Mines dating back to the time of the Romans were successively worked until at least the Middle Ages, and even revived in the early years of the twentieth century, according to the writings of Sir Eldon Gorst, who in 1902 visited the Eastern Desert in his capacity as an advisor to the Egyptian government and found that gold extraction here necessitated higher working expenses and difficult conditions for smaller reward (Starkey 2000). The author found this description echoed in the words of a local informant, to wit: The easy gold had been taken, and only the hard gold remained. The informant, an Abadi named Shady, described how new veins of extractable gold had been discovered in Bir Tawil about fifteen years ago, and how the Ababda people set themselves to the task of mining it, becoming rich in the process.
It is very likely that the unprecedented geopolitical situation in which Bir Tawil finds itself (to wit: that it is claimed by no actual nation) is the only reason why Western mining concerns have not yet supplanted the Ababda operation there. What then are their rights in the area? According to international law, a strong case can be made for the ethnic group‘s sovereignty over the land, as well as their rights to what lies beneath it.
Any assessment of international law and what it has to say on the Ababda‘s rights in this regard would arguably begin with the work of philosopher and theologian Francisco de Vitoria, who was a renowned jurist in Renaissance Spain. Vitoria was a pioneer in his extension of the principles of natural law into the international sphere when he contended that the concept of jus gentium, or ―law of Nations,‖ (which dates back to the Roman legal system) compels nations as well as peoples, and that without just cause, indigenous peoples could not be dispossessed of their natural dominion over their lands (Vitoria 1991).
Roman law is also the source of the concept, already discussed, of Terra Nullius, to wit: land without an owner could be claimed by any nation, providing certain conditions are met. As a result, indigenous occupancy was redefined, or outright ignored, in order to apply Terra Nullius as a means to appropriate land. Australia presents a relevant illustration of this point, wherein Aboriginal lands were routinely taken over by the settler population on the basis of this legal interpretation of Terra Nullius, citing the nomadism of the Aboriginal peoples as not rising to the standard of permanent occupation. This legal paradigm is anachronistic, however. It held dominance throughout the colonial era and lasted until the mid 1970s, when a landmark ruling was issued by the International Court of Justice. In the 1975 Western Sahara Case, the ICJ expanded the legally acceptable definition of international land tenure beyond the strictly European notion of land title when it issued the following finding:
―It [is] clear that the nomadism of the great majority of the peoples of Western Sahara at the time of its colonization gave rise to certain ties of a legal character. […] The tribes, in their migrations, had grazing pastures, cultivated lands, and wells or water-holes in both territories, and their burial grounds in one or other territory. These basic elements of nomads‘ way of life […] were in some measure the subject of tribal rights, and their use was in general regulated by customs‖ (Gilbert 2014)
This proved to be a small step, however, and it would take decades before an adherence to human rights standards would eventually transform the structure of the international legal system. A 1986 UN report titled ―The Problem of Discrimination against Indigenous Populations‖ looked specifically at the human rights issues raised by mining operations in indigenous peoples‘ lands by stating that:
―Where possible within the prevailing legal system, the resources of the subsoil of indigenous land also must be regarded as the exclusive property of indigenous communities. Where this is rendered impossible by the fact that the deposits in the subsoil are the preserve of the State, the state must […] allow full participation by indigenous communities in respect of: the granting of exploration and exploitation licenses; the profits generated by such operations; the procedures for determining damage caused and compensation payable to indigenous communities as a result of the exploitation of the resources of the subsoil of indigenous land and in the consideration of all consequences of such exploration and exploitation activities. ―No mining whatsoever should be allowed on indigenous land without first negotiating an agreement with the indigenous peoples who will be affected by the mining, guaranteeing them a fair share of the revenue that may be obtained,‖ the report continued (Orellana 2002; Cobo 1986).
Palestinian Relocation in Bir-Tawil
There are a number of legal instruments that reflect a general acceptance of the notion that indigenous peoples have the right to be consulted prior to any law or action, taken by a national government, that affects them. Thus, the right of indigenous peoples over their land is not restricted to demonstrable possession, but also from their spiritual connection and communal stewardship over the land in question (Anaya 2005).
Article 26 of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples lays this out succinctly:
- Indigenous peoples have the right to the lands, territories and resources which they have traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise used or acquired.
- Indigenous peoples have the right to own, use, develop and control the lands, territories and resources that they possess by reason of traditional ownership or other traditional occupation or use, as well as those which they have otherwise acquired.
- States shall give legal recognition and protection to these lands, territories and resources. Such recognition shall be conducted with due respect to the customs, traditions and land tenure systems of the indigenous peoples concerned (Assembly 2007).
This legal recognition is all the more important given the uncomfortable reality that indigenous peoples tend to inhabit underdeveloped areas marked by vulnerability to natural and man-made disasters where they often experience difficulty in seeking out an existence, including in such harsh environments as the high mountains, the tundra, and in the case of the Ababda and others, the desert. In such hardscrabble biomes, natural resources take on an added importance, not just because such resources are often inextricably linked to the ethnic group‘s culture, traditions, and spiritual and/or religious belief systems, but for mere survival. The right to have a say in how those natural resources are exploited is therefore far more important to indigenous populations than it is to the country‘s city dwellers, often living hundreds of miles away.
A number of other instruments exist that may be used to bolster the Ababda‘s legal claim over the mineral rights of their traditional land, including that portion currently delineated by the borders of Bir Tawil. For example, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD)—the body that monitors implementation of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination—adopted a General Recommendation XXIII (51) on the rights of indigenous peoples at the Committee‘s 1235th meeting on 18 August, 1997, which included the following text:
―The Committee especially calls upon States parties to recognize and protect the rights of indigenous peoples to own, develop, control and use their communal lands, territories and resources and, where they have been deprived of their lands and territories traditionally owned or otherwise inhabited or used without their free and informed consent, to take steps to return those lands and territories. Only when this is for factual reasons not possible, the right to restitution should be substituted by the right to just, fair and prompt compensation. Such compensation should as far as possible take the form of lands and territories‖ (Daes 2001).
Even in cases where the government retains ownership over mineral right to a territory—as opposed to the unique situation in Bir Tawil—there are still duties and responsibilities to the indigenous population. One may turn to Article 15 of the International Labour Organization Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, or ILO No. 169. On the issue of ownership over sub-surface resources, Article 15 (2) is clear:
―In cases in which the State retains ownership of mineral or sub-surface resources or rights to other resources pertaining to lands, governments shall establish or maintain procedures through which they shall consult these peoples, with a view to ascertaining whether and to what degree their interests would be prejudiced, before undertaking or permitting any programmes for the exploration or exploitation of such resources pertaining to their lands‖ (International Labour Organization 1989).
The latter applies even when the state ―retains ownership of mineral or sub-surface resources,‖ which is not so cut and dry in a Terra Nullius like Bir Tawil. Hence, the Ababda case would seem to be even stronger than it would otherwise be were the state—be it Egypt or Sudan—to claim effective control over the territory.
Thus, International law may be used to justify the Ababda people‘s right to exercise sovereignty over any mineral extraction operations in Bir Tawil. However, too often it is the case that legal rights—especially given the practical reality of the world order and anarchy in international relations—are akin the rules of sailing at sea: might has right. States might easily choose to disregard the legal measures and norms outlined above in the absence of any judicial enforcement mechanisms. Fortunately, there are avenues of redress in such cases, such as the African Court on Human and Peoples‘ Rights (ACHPR). Established by African countries to protect human rights in Africa as a compliment to the activities of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the ACHPR was designed for almost this exact situation*. Unfortunately, at the current time, neither Egypt nor Sudan is one of the 30 States that have ratified the Protocol which established the court, and so individuals from there would be unable to bring cases in front of the court. Moreover, the handling of Bir Tawil as a Terra Nullius would likewise be precedent-setting, with little in the way of legal precedent on which to rely by means of a blueprint. (Pereira & Gough 2013).
Another option would be the International Court of Justice (ICJ) though it has weighed in on the issue, it should not be the first choice for an indigenous people seeking justice for a perceived violation of their rights. The ICJ is primarily a forum for state-to-state contestation of disputes, and is less suited as a venue for non-state actors to press their cases. Moreover, the ICJ‘s record on issues of indigenous land rights is less than progressive. While the court did, in its Western Sahara advisory opinion, invalidate anachronistic doctrines such as discovery, conquest, and Terra Nullius as acceptable justifications for advanced nations to secure sovereignty over indigenous lands, it failed to recognize traditional indigenous land tenure systems as valid under international law (Anghie 2007).
A more effective redress mechanism would be the compliance and monitoring bodies erected for various international Human Rights treaties. Unlike the ICJ, the UN Human Rights Council is set up to receive submissions from non-state actors on issues relating to violations of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). As stated above, land and natural resource rights can be construed as falling under the category of human rights in this regard. Moreover, the HRC has a strong record of interpreting Article 27 of the ICCPR as being inclusive of indigenous land rights, though only insofar as these are part and parcel of cultural rights. Likewise, the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (UNCESCR) has ruled in favour of indigenous rights over natural resources (Pereira & Gough 2013).
Conclusion
Relocating Palestinians in Bir-Tawil is an indecent proposal and as we have seen, there appears to be ample precedent and legislation within the canon of international law, institutions, and norms to support the interpretation that the Ababda hold effective sovereignty over the mineral rights – and de facto the territory – in Bir Tawil. Foreign companies, as well as claimant monarchs such as Heaton and Dixit, or now proposals discussing the relocation of Gazans serve as a harsh reminder that the Ababda‘s sovereignty over the area is under constant threat. Yet, the various instruments of international law tend to support a solid case proving that sovereignty and mineral rights to Bir Tawil should properly be conferred to the one group that has the longest continual claim to this land : the Ababda people.
Nowadays, the Ababda way of life is under pressure of modern developments, notably urbanization, military activity near the Sudanese border, and the explosive development of tourism along this part of the Red Sea coast over the past decade or so. Very little of the culture of this people has been recorded thus far by anthropologists, and their unique customs are already disappearing.
Preserving the Ababda heritage is needed as well as the many aspects of their culture that has long been recognized as an added value to the region. There is no doubt that chosing the Ababda over the Gazans is fairly easy.
For one simple reason. For the Sake of Humanity.
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*In the past, the court has ruled in favour of the Ogoni people in an action alleging that the government of Nigeria had violated articles of the African Charter. The Ogoni were granted compensation as well as relief and resettlement assistance in a case involving victims of government raids and damage to land and rivers by oil companies.
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