Do European countries not fully grasp the threat posed by Abu Mohammad al-Jawlani (now Ahmed al-Sharaa), leader of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and de facto ruler of Syria? The answer to this question touches upon a complex mix of geopolitics, strategic priorities, and perception gaps.

Europe’s engagement with Ahmed al-Sharaa, formerly known as Abu Mohammad al-Jawlani and leader of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), who became the de facto ruler of Syria following the fall of Bashar al-Assad in December 2024, reflects a strategic shift in EU foreign policy as of March 20, 2025. This engagement is deeply intertwined with the ongoing migrant crisis in Europe and the desire to mitigate Turkey’s leverage over the EU, particularly concerning Syrian refugees.

Background and Context

The Syrian civil war, now in its 14th year, has displaced over 12 million people, with 6.2 million Syrian refugees hosted primarily in neighboring countries like Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan, and approximately one million in Europe (UNHCR). The fall of Assad, facilitated by HTS’s lightning offensive, marked a seismic shift, prompting the EU to reassess its Syria policy. Al-Sharaa, once a jihadist leader with ties to al-Qaeda, has rebranded himself as a pragmatic leader, dropping his nom de guerre, trimming his beard, pledging inclusivity, and donning suits to meet foreign dignitaries (e.g., U.S. officials met him in Damascus in December 2024). He’s claimed HTS poses no threat to the West, focusing instead on stabilizing Syria and countering Iran and Hezbollah. This transformation has been met with cautious optimism by some European leaders, despite HTS remaining a designated terrorist group by the UN, UK, US, and EU (house of Commons Library), but it has also resonated with some European policymakers desperate for stability in a region that’s fueled migration crises—a top political headache for them since 2015. For instance, his governance in Idlib, where schools and hospitals function under HTS’s Syrian Salvation Government, offers a veneer of order that contrasts with the chaos of Assad’s final years or ISIS’s reign.

But this optimism might overlook the darker threads. al-Jawlani’s past isn’t just a footnote—he fought U.S. troops in Iraq, led the al-Nusra Front (an al-Qaeda branch), and built HTS into a force accused of human rights abuses like torture and arbitrary arrests, even if he denies direct orders for such acts. His break with al-Qaeda in 2016 and ISIS crackdowns (e.g., killing ISIS leader Abu Hussein al-Qurashi in 2023) do not erase the ideological roots or the risk he could revert to extremism if it suits his power. Since March 2025 ongoing violence—alleged killings of Alawites and intimidation of minorities—suggests HTS’s “pluralism” might be more rhetoric than reality. Yet, Europe’s lens seems fixed on short-term gains over long-term threats.

EU’s Foundational Principles: Human Rights and Humanitarian Ideals

The EU prides itself on a framework built on human rights, dignity, and solidarity. The Treaty on European Union (Article 2) declares that the Union is founded on “respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities.” The EU’s asylum policies, like the 1951 Refugee Convention and the Common European Asylum System (CEAS), commit to protecting those fleeing persecution, a promise tested by the Syrian refugee crisis since 2011. Hosting around one million Syrians, the EU has often framed itself as a moral leader, contrasting its humanitarian stance with less welcoming regions.

Europe’s Motivations for Engaging with al-Sharaa

The EU’s engagement, evidenced by high-level visits such as French Foreign Minister Jean-Noël Barrot and German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock meeting al-Sharaa in Damascus on January 3, 2025 (Washington Post), is driven by several factors:

• Humanitarian and Migration Goals: The EU is keen to stabilize Syria to facilitate the voluntary return of Syrian refugees, addressing a persistent crisis that has strained European resources and fueled political debates. Recent EU proposals, such as the March 11, 2025, revision to the Return Directive, aim to streamline returns, potentially including Syrians (European Commission). Discussions in late 2024, as reported by Euronews, highlight the growing interest in reassessing conditions for returns, with UNHCR noting that 27% of Syrian refugees now intend to return within 12 months (UNHCR).
• Economic and Political Pressure: The migrant crisis has been a political lightning rod, with far-right parties leveraging it to gain traction. Stabilizing Syria could reduce irregular migration, aligning with the EU’s focus on control, externalization, and return, as outlined in the 2025 Migration Outlook by ICMPD (ICMPD).
• Humanitarian Aid and Sanctions Relief: The EU announced a €235 million humanitarian aid package in January 2025 and agreed to eliminate part of its sanctions, aiming for approval on February 24, 2025, to encourage inclusive governance and respect for human rights (Carnegie Endowment). This is partly to support reconstruction, which could enable refugee returns.

The Role of Turkey and Erdogan’s Leverage

Turkey’s role is central to understanding Europe’s strategy. As of early 2025, Turkey hosts approximately 3.1 million registered Syrian refugees, making it a critical player in the migrant crisis (European Commission). President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has historically used this as leverage, threatening to open borders and allow refugees into Europe if his demands—such as financial aid or support for Turkey’s policies—are not met. Notable instances include his 2020 warning that “millions” of migrants would head to Europe (Euractiv) and a 2019 threat to release 3.6 million refugees (CNBC). The 2016 EU-Turkey deal, offering aid in exchange for Turkey’s assistance in reducing migrant arrivals, has been a cornerstone of this relationship, but tensions persist (Migration Policy Institute).

Post-Assad, Turkey has shown interest in facilitating returns, opening the Yayladagi border gate in December 2024 for safe and voluntary returns (Reuters). However, Europe’s engagement with al-Sharaa aims to bypass Turkey’s intermediary role, reducing Erdogan’s leverage. By working directly with Damascus, the EU can potentially create conditions for direct repatriation, diminishing Turkey’s ability to use refugees as a bargaining chip. This is particularly relevant given Erdogan’s past promises to repatriate refugees, which have been politically motivated but challenging to implement due to Syria’s instability (Reuters).

The EU-Syria Engagement

The EU’s engagement is not without controversy. Al-Sharaa’s past, including his role in the insurgency against US and UK forces in Iraq in the 2000s and HTS’s origins in al-Qaeda, raises concerns (House of Commons Library). Israel, for instance, has labeled him a “wolf in sheep’s clothing,” wary of his potential to turn Syria into a jihadist launchpad (France 24). Despite this, the EU is betting on his stated aims of inclusivity, as seen in diplomatic engagements like Italian Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani’s visit on January 10, 2025 (Reuters).

The EU’s strategy includes addressing security concerns, such as the potential resurgence of the Islamic State, and supporting documentation of past suffering under Assad, aligning with humanitarian principles (Carnegie Endowment). However, critics, including Amnesty International, have warned that EU return proposals could lead to human rights violations, highlighting the tension between migration control and ethical considerations (Amnesty International).

Implications for Migrants and Returns

The EU’s focus on returns is evident in recent policy proposals. The March 11, 2025, revision to the Return Directive aims to establish a common EU return system, potentially including Syrians, with mutual recognition of return decisions (European Commission). Seven EU member states in May 2024 suggested reassessing conditions in Syria for voluntary returns, reflecting growing interest (AP News). However, Migrationpolicy.org argues that large-scale returns may be premature due to unstable conditions, such as housing shortages and limited job access.

UNHCR data from March 2025 shows a significant shift, with 80% of Syrian refugees hoping to return and 27% intending to do so within 12 months, up from 57% and 1.7% respectively in April 2024 (UNHCR). This aligns with the EU’s strategy, but ensuring safe, voluntary, and dignified returns remains a challenge, especially given reports of ongoing violence in Syria, such as alleged killings of Alawites and intimidation of minorities.

An EU disconnect or moral bankrupcy?

After decades of Middle East quagmires—Iraq, Libya, Syria—European nations are wary of more conflict. Recognizing Jolani as a stabilizing figure, however flawed, aligns with a hope to stem refugee flows and repatriate Syrians, a strategic priority for leaders facing domestic pressure from right-wing parties. Jolani anti-Iran stance dovetails with Western interests, and his outreach (e.g., meeting the UN envoy in December 2024) signals a willingness to play ball. The U.S. dropping its $10 million bounty and engaging diplomatically might nudge Europe to see him as a partner, not a pariah. It is therefore a way to use pragmatism over ideology. European intelligence may underestimate HTS’s internal dynamics or Jolani’s endgame, especially given Syria’s opacity post-Assad. If his forces are clashing with minorities or rival factions, it’s not clear this fully registers in Brussels or Berlin.

Critics, though, argue this is naive. Jolani’s HTS remains a U.S.-designated terrorist group, and his “moderation” could be a survival tactic—akin to the Taliban’s initial overtures in 2021—until he consolidates power. Israel, for one, calls him a “wolf in sheep’s clothing,” wary of his Golan Heights ties and potential to turn Syria into a jihadist launchpad, despite his current disavowals of conflict with them. Europe’s failure to heed this could stem from a mix of wishful thinking and distraction—climate goals, Ukraine, and domestic politics often drown out Middle East nuance.

Why It’s Moral Bankruptcy

So, does Europe show moral bankrupcy or simply pragmatism? “Moral bankruptcy” fits because the EU’s engagement with al-Sharaa and its repatriation push clash with its humanitarian rhetoric:

• Partnering with a Terrorist: By cozying up to al-Sharaa, the EU overlooks his past and HTS’s record to stabilize Syria—hoping it enables returns. This contradicts its anti-terror stance and human rights commitments, suggesting principles bend when politically convenient.
• Prioritizing Migration Control Over Safety: The haste to deem Syria safe, despite evidence of unrest, prioritizes offloading migrants over ensuring their protection. This undermines the EU’s asylum obligations and paints a picture of self-interest trumping duty.
• Domestic Pressure Over Ethics: The migrant crisis fuels far-right gains, pressuring leaders to reduce numbers. Engaging al-Sharaa and pushing returns look like cynical moves to appease voters, not uphold values (ICMPD Migration Outlook 2025).

Europe’s engagement with al-Sharaa is a multifaceted strategy, with the migrant crisis and reducing Turkey’s leverage being significant drivers. By facilitating the return of Syrian refugees, the EU aims to address domestic political pressures and stabilize Syria, betting Jolani’s pragmatism holds, and potentially diminishing Erdogan’s ability to use migrants as a bargaining chip. However, the controversy surrounding al-Sharaa’s past and HTS’s human rights record underscores the complexity and risks of this approach, requiring careful monitoring to ensure safe and voluntary returns.

The EU pragmatism is not mere hypocrisy; it’s a collapse of the moral framework the EU claims to embody, choosing a terrorist-tainted ally and risky returns over the harder path of consistent humanitarianism. The Treaty on European Union (Article 2) and the 1951 Refugee Convention enshrine protection for those fleeing persecution, yet the EU’s actions suggest a willingness to sidestep these for domestic gain. Partnering with a terrorist-tainted leader and pushing repatriation despite Syria’s instability—housing shortages, job scarcity, and reports of violence against minorities (Alawite killings) signal a betrayal of the non-refoulement principle.

Conclusion

This isn’t a stumble—it’s a calculated discard of principles. The EU’s €235 million aid and sanctions relief (Carnegie Endowment) prop up al-Sharaa not for Syria’s sake, but to clear its migrant books.

It’s a Faustian bargain: moral authority swapped for votes and border control. The fallout—rising xenophobia, economic self-harm, and a tarnished global image—shows the cost. “Moral bankruptcy” bites because it names the EU’s fall from grace, not as a passive drift, but as a willful cash-out of its soul. Europe’s bargain is a deliberate depletion of moral capital to offload a million Syrian refugees and dodge Turkey’s blackmail, prioritizing political survival over integrity.

In no way does Europe believe that al-Sharaa has truly shed his jihadist skin—or just tailored it into a blazer.