South Africa’s Hamas Problem

When Politics Undermines Security

South Africa continues to occupy a precarious position within the global architecture for combating illicit finance. Despite concerted efforts to overhaul its anti-money laundering (AML) framework, Pretoria remains ensnared in the Financial Action Task Force’s (FATF) “grey list”—a designation reserved for jurisdictions exhibiting significant deficiencies in obstructing money laundering and the financing of terrorism. The implications of this listing are profound: reputational harm that deters foreign capital inflows, escalates the cost of international transactions, and undermines the integrity of South Africa’s financial system.

The Ideological Impediment to Counter-Terrorism Reform

South Africa’s capacity to implement a robust counterterrorism financing regime is fundamentally hampered by the ideological orientation and foreign policy priorities of its incumbent government. The African National Congress (ANC), which has governed South Africa since the advent of democracy, has consistently demonstrated an overtly sympathetic stance toward Hamas and other Islamist entities. This alignment transcends rhetorical expressions of solidarity, manifesting in high-level official engagements, including repeated hosting of senior Hamas delegations and conferral of political legitimacy upon organizations designated as terrorist groups by the United States and the European Union.

Such actions reflect a broader anti-imperialist worldview wherein the ANC regards movements like Hamas as fellow actors in global liberation struggles, thereby impeding both the formal designation of Hamas and Hezbollah as terrorist organizations under South African law and the rigorous enforcement of international financial sanctions. This political disposition translates into administrative inertia and institutional unwillingness to operationalize anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing (AML/CTF) measures where Islamist groups are implicated.

Notable manifestations include the public hospitality extended to Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal in 2015 and the appointment of figures from organizations suspected of funding Hamas to national advisory bodies. Most emblematically, the ANC has signed formal memoranda of understanding with Hamas pledging support for its “struggle for the liberation of Palestine”, while ANC officials have repeatedly declared their identification with the proscribed organization. In such circumstances, even technically sound regulatory reforms remain unlikely to yield substantive results whilst the ANC government persists in its unwillingness to sever ties with Islamist actors.

FATF Assessment and South Africa’s Reform Trajectory

In June 2025, FATF evaluators determined that South Africa had substantially completed all action items within its compliance framework, warranting an on-site assessment to verify implementation and sustainability of AML/CTF reforms. Since its grey-listing in February 2023, South Africa claims to have addressed corrective measures prescribed by FATF, encompassing enhanced customer due-diligence protocols in banking and strengthened interagency coordination.

Nevertheless, structural deficiencies persist that transcend mere technical compliance. Of particular concern is Pretoria’s continued reliance on the UN Security Council’s consolidated sanctions list—which notably excludes both Hezbollah and Hamas—rather than instituting an autonomous, comprehensive domestic designation regime. Without formally proscribing these entities under South African law, enforcement agencies lack the requisite legal instruments to freeze assets, impede fundraising, or prosecute financiers effectively.

The Nexus of Islamist Proxies and Domestic Networks

Hamas and Its South African Affiliates

The penetration of Hamas-linked networks into South African civil society represents a particularly acute vulnerability in the country’s counterterrorism architecture. U.S. authorities designated the Union of Good as a terrorist-support network in 2008, identifying 17 South African charities—including the Muslim Judicial Council (MJC) and Gift of the Givers—as conduits for Hamas fundraising. South African cleric Ebrahim Gabriels emerged as a pivotal intermediary, simultaneously holding leadership positions within the MJC, the Al-Aqsa Foundation’s South African branch (sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury in 2003), and the Al-Quds International Foundation (sanctioned in 2012).

These organizations have, on multiple occasions, extended official hospitality to senior Hamas figures—most conspicuously Khaled Meshaal in 2015—under the aegis of the ruling African National Congress, thereby affording the movement both political legitimacy and logistical access. The case of Imtiaz Sooliman, founder and director of Gift of the Givers, exemplifies the problematic intersection of humanitarian work and terrorist financing networks. Despite his organization’s alleged ties to Hamas through the Union of Good network, President Cyril Ramaphosa appointed Sooliman to the National Dialogue, a select group of leaders tasked with addressing South Africa’s challenges. Sooliman’s subsequent descent into overt antisemitism—declaring in October 2024 that “Zionists run the world with fear. They control the world with money”—underscores the government’s tolerance for individuals and organizations with demonstrable connections to proscribed terrorist entities.

Hezbollah’s Financial Networks

In April 2023, U.S. sanctions targeted Nazem Said Ahmad, a Lebanon-based financier and his South African-linked commercial front companies, for orchestrating upwards of $400 million in transactions benefiting Hezbollah. Ahmad’s network, which includes family members operating legitimate businesses in South Africa, represents one of Hezbollah’s most significant international financing operations. Despite these designations and the availability of detailed intelligence regarding the network’s operations, South African authorities have yet to pursue asset freezes or criminal charges against Ahmad’s network, signaling either institutional inertia, prosecutorial incapacity, or deliberate non-compliance with international counterterrorism obligations.

Islamic State Affiliates

South Africa’s track record proves equally troubling regarding the Islamic State (ISIS). Farhad Hoomer, formally designated by U.S. authorities as an ISIS facilitator, was twice detained on South African soil—first in 2018 and again in 2021—only to be released without formal charges on both occasions. Investigations attributed these miscarriages of justice to both administrative dysfunction and ministerial malfeasance. The July 2025 dismissal of the national police minister—amid credible allegations of collusion with violent organized-crime figures—underscores endemic governance weaknesses that have consistently impeded effective counterterrorism operations and created an environment of impunity for international terrorist networks.

Strategic Imperatives and Policy Recommendations

Domestic Designations of Hamas and Hezbollah

An unequivocal step toward remediating South Africa’s compliance shortfall would involve the formal proscription of Hamas and Hezbollah as terrorist organizations in domestic legislation. By aligning its statutory framework with that of major Western democracies, Pretoria would empower law-enforcement agencies to freeze and confiscate assets linked to proscribed entities, criminalize material support, recruitment, and facilitation, enhance interjurisdictional cooperation through mutual legal assistance, and prosecute individuals and organizations providing financial or logistical support.

However, such measures would necessitate a fundamental shift in the ANC’s ideological orientation and foreign policy priorities—a transformation that appears unlikely given the party’s continued public embrace of Hamas leadership and its conceptualization of these groups as legitimate liberation movements rather than terrorist organizations.

Institutional Capacity-Building

South Africa must invest substantially in specialized training for financial-intelligence units, border-security personnel, and magistrates to ensure robust enforcement of existing and prospective AML/CTF statutes. Establishing an independent oversight mechanism could further insulate the process from political interference and corruption. Critical areas for development encompass enhanced financial intelligence analysis capabilities, improved inter-agency coordination mechanisms, strengthened judicial capacity for complex terrorism financing cases, and comprehensive asset recovery and forfeiture procedures.

International Cooperation and Peer Pressure

The United States, as a leading proponent of global counterterrorism norms, should leverage its influence within FATF to sustain South Africa’s grey-list status until demonstrable progress is achieved. Concurrently, U.S. and European law-enforcement agencies could intensify intelligence-sharing and joint investigative initiatives to disrupt cross-border financing channels. However, such cooperation must be predicated on genuine commitment from South African authorities to address the ideological and political obstacles that have historically undermined counterterrorism efforts.

The Fundamental Challenge: Political Will

The central impediment to South Africa’s delisting from FATF’s grey list lies not in technical deficiencies or bureaucratic incapacity, but in the ruling party’s unwillingness to confront organizations and individuals with demonstrable ties to internationally designated terrorist groups. The ANC’s continued embrace of Hamas, its tolerance for Hezbollah financing networks, and its failure to prosecute ISIS facilitators reflect a broader political culture that views counterterrorism obligations as subordinate to ideological solidarity with perceived liberation movements.

This political stance has created a permissive environment for terrorist financing that no amount of technical reform can adequately address. Until the South African government demonstrates genuine commitment to severing ties with designated terrorist organizations and their support networks, the country will remain a high-risk jurisdiction for illicit finance, regardless of its formal compliance with FATF recommendations.

Conclusion

South Africa’s grey-listing by FATF represents more than a technical assessment of regulatory compliance; it constitutes an indictment of a political system that has consistently prioritized ideological solidarity over international security obligations. To extricate itself from the grey list and attract sustained foreign investment, Pretoria must transcend perfunctory compliance and embrace a rigorous, rights-respecting counterterrorism financing regime that acknowledges the reality of contemporary terrorist threats rather than romanticizing them as liberation movements.

This transformation requires not merely legislative amendments or bureaucratic restructuring, but a fundamental recalibration of South Africa’s foreign policy orientation and domestic security priorities. Only through such a comprehensive strategy—one that prioritizes the rule of law over ideological affinity—can South Africa hope to mitigate the threats posed by Hezbollah, Hamas, and ISIS affiliates while reaffirming its commitment to the international legal order. Until such political will emerges, South Africa will remain a vulnerable node in the global terrorist financing network, regardless of its technical compliance with international standards.