Hamas’s Consolidation Through Violence and the Inevitability of Resumed Conflict in Gaza

The recent ceasefire between Israel and Hamas, announced with cautious optimism by international mediators, has revealed a grim reality that Middle East experts and anthropologists of Palestinian society anticipated: the so-called “peace” is merely a tactical pause masking an internal war of purification. President Donald Trump’s ultimatum—”If they don’t disarm, we will disarm them. They know I’m not playing games”—reflects a Western misunderstanding of both Hamas’s ideological commitment to armed resistance (muqawama) and the complex clan dynamics (hamula) that structure Gazans’ social and political lives. The videos emerging from Gaza showing Hamas executing alleged “Israeli collaborators” in broad daylight are not aberrations but rather manifestations of a calculated strategy to eliminate internal opposition, demonstrate continued authority, and prepare for the next phase of conflict.​​

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Phase I: The Ceasefire That Became a Pretext for Purge

The first phase of the U.S.-backed ceasefire agreement—signed on October 9, 2025, in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt—appeared to begin successfully when Hamas released 20 living Israeli hostages on October 13. This high-profile gesture created momentary optimism among international observers desperate to believe that a pathway to peace had finally emerged. However, within hours of the hostage release, videos began circulating on social media showing Hamas militants executing Palestinians in Gaza’s streets, claiming their victims were “Israeli collaborators”.​

Trump’s immediate response was characteristically blunt but revealed a fundamental misunderstanding of the situation. He dismissed the executions as Hamas “taking out a couple of gangs that were very bad,” stating, “they killed a number of gang members. That didn’t bother me much, to be honest with you”. This interpretation—that Hamas was conducting legitimate law enforcement operations against criminal elements—fundamentally misreads the nature of the violence. In reality, Hamas initiated a systematic campaign to eliminate political opposition, silence dissent, and demonstrate to Gaza’s population and rival Palestinian factions that it remains the sole sovereign authority.​

The disarmament of Hamas, explicitly stipulated as the linchpin of the peace initiative, has become the focal point of escalating tensions. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu demanded in an October 14 CBS interview that Hamas fulfill its obligations and disarm immediately. U.S. Central Command issued a statement on October 15 calling on Hamas to “suspend violence” and seize this “historic opportunity for peace by fully standing down, strictly adhering to President Trump’s 20-point peace plan and disarming without delay”. These exhortations, while politically satisfying for Western audiences, reveal a profound disconnect from the realities of Hamas’s ideology, organizational structure, and strategic calculations.​

The Hamula System and Hamas’s Governance Strategy

To understand why disarmament is impossible and why Phase II of any peace plan will inevitably collapse, one must first comprehend Gaza’s social fabric, which is woven from a complex network of kinship groups (hamula for clans, ashira for Bedouin tribes) that have historically served as the primary organizational units of Palestinian society. These kinship structures, far from being archaic remnants, remain central to social organization: 75% of Gazans report that clan membership remains socially important in their lives, and 85% consider their clan essential for personal security. This is not merely a cultural curiosity but a fundamental political reality that any governance structure in Gaza must navigate.​

When Hamas seized control of Gaza in 2007, they confronted a landscape dominated by powerful armed clans that had been weaponized during the Second Intifada. The Palestinian Authority under Fatah had practiced neopatrimonialism, deliberately empowering large clans like the Hillis and creating clan-based security forces, which inadvertently transformed kinship groups into militias when Israeli counterattacks destroyed formal security infrastructure. Hamas’s initial response was systematic detribalization: a violent disarmament campaign that crushed the most powerful clans, including the Dughmush (“the Sopranos of Gaza”) and the Fatah-aligned Hillis clan, through siege tactics and military assault.​ However, Hamas’s governance strategy evolved from crude suppression to sophisticated co-optation. Through the General Administration for Clan Affairs and Societal Conciliation (GACASC), Hamas restructured kinship institutions, diminishing the power of individual mukhtars (clan headmen) while strengthening clan councils (majlis al-‘aila), which Hamas could more easily penetrate and monitor. Critically, Hamas integrated the traditional Bedouin legal system (‘urf) into its governance apparatus, creating Islamic reconciliation committees (lijnat islah) that blended customary law with Islamic jurisprudence. This process—which scholars describe as moving from “Islamisation of tribalism to tribalization of Islamism”—gave Hamas both legitimacy and intelligence networks within Gaza’s social fabric.​

Sumud, Resistance Ideology, and the Impossibility of Disarmament

Trump’s demand that Hamas disarm, and the Central Command’s call for the organization to “fully stand down,” fundamentally misunderstand the ideological foundations of Palestinian resistance movements. The concept of sumud (steadfastness) is not merely psychological resilience but a comprehensive framework for understanding Palestinian identity, survival, and resistance under occupation. Sumud encompasses “individual and collective action to protect family and community survival, wellbeing, dignity, Palestinian identity and culture, and a determination to remain on the land”. For Hamas, armed resistance is inseparable from sumud—it is the active, masculine expression of Palestinian steadfastness against what they perceive as ongoing colonization.​

The demand for disarmament thus represents an existential threat to Hamas’s identity and legitimacy. From Hamas’s perspective, disarmament would constitute betrayal of the resistance (muqawama), abandonment of Palestinian prisoners, and surrender to Israeli security demands without achieving liberation or even statehood. The organization’s charter and political program remain committed to armed struggle as a legitimate form of resistance, regardless of temporary tactical ceasefires.​ Western policymakers consistently misread Hamas’s participation in ceasefires as evidence of moderation or readiness for transformation into a purely political entity. However, as terrorism studies and political science research demonstrates, Hamas belongs to the category of ideologically committed insurgent governments—similar to the LTTE in Sri Lanka or SPLA/M in Sudan—that combine territorial governance with ongoing liberation struggle. For such organizations, ceasefires are tactical pauses for consolidation, not strategic shifts toward demilitarization.​

Even if Hamas leadership were somehow inclined to disarm—which all evidence suggests they are not—the practical challenges would be insurmountable. Hamas began the October 7, 2023 war with tens of thousands of rockets and missiles, 24 military battalions, large numbers of RPGs, and extensive munitions stockpiles. Does disarmament mean surrendering heavy weapons while retaining small arms? Who would verify the process? Hamas will not hand weapons to Israel, and no credible alternative security force exists in Gaza that could receive, inventory, and secure such an arsenal.​

The Purge: Eliminating Internal Opposition Under the Guise of Justice

The executions currently unfolding in Gaza—which Hamas cynically frames as punishment for “Israeli collaborators”—represent a textbook case of revolutionary terror designed to consolidate power during a vulnerable transition period. This violence serves multiple functions that illuminate Hamas’s strategic calculations and the futility of expecting peaceful governance.​

First, these executions eliminate genuine political opposition from rival factions, including Fatah supporters, secular nationalists, and members of powerful clans who maintained independent power bases. During the 2006-2007 period of internecine fighting between Hamas and Fatah, many clan leaders aligned with one faction or another. The current purge targets individuals who might form alternative centers of authority or collaborate with external actors—including Israel, the Palestinian Authority, or international mediators—to establish post-conflict governance structures that exclude Hamas.​ Second, the public nature of these executions—conducted in broad daylight and deliberately filmed—serves pedagogical purposes within the framework of governance through terror. They communicate to Gaza’s population that Hamas remains the sole sovereign authority despite military losses to Israel, that any form of dissent or alternative political organization will be met with lethal force, and that the international community’s protection extends only to abstract principles, not to actual individuals who might oppose Hamas.​ Third, from an anthropological perspective, these executions exploit and manipulate the ‘urf system’s logic of collective responsibility and honor restoration. By branding victims as “collaborators,” Hamas invokes deep cultural scripts about betrayal and collective shame that discourage family members from seeking revenge or speaking out, as doing so would confirm the dishonor. This is governance through cultural competency—Hamas’s long engagement with kinship institutions has taught them how to weaponize clan honor codes for political control.​

The Internal War: Clans, Factions, and the Struggle for Gaza’s Future

The current violence in Gaza is best understood not as post-conflict chaos but as a deliberate civil war of consolidation. While comprehensive real-time reporting from Gaza remains limited due to Hamas’s information control and the security situation, the patterns emerging are consistent with Hamas’s historical approach to opposition and the structural dynamics of clan-state relations in Palestinian territories.​

Several categories of clans and families have historically opposed Hamas or maintained independent power:

• Fatah-Aligned Traditional Clans: Large landowning families (muwatinun) who aligned with the Palestinian Authority and Fatah, such as factions within the Hillis clan (approximately 8,000 members) and other families who received patronage and security positions under PA rule. These clans represent an alternative legitimacy structure rooted in Palestinian nationalism rather than Islamic resistance.​

• Criminal Networks Masquerading as Clans: Groups like the Dughmush clan, which combined kinship structures with organized crime—smuggling, kidnapping, weapons trafficking—and maintained territorial control through force. While ideologically uncommitted, they represent potential spoilers who could align with any external actor offering resources or protection.​

• Bedouin Tribes with Independent Authority: Bedouin ashiras whose authority derives from mastery of ‘urf law and whose judges (muhakimun) commanded respect independent of any political faction. These represented alternative dispute resolution mechanisms that could bypass Hamas’s judicial control.​

• Professional Classes and Secular Intellectuals: Though not organized as kinship groups, these individuals often had clan protection and represented potential nuclei for alternative political movements, particularly among younger, educated Gazans frustrated with both Hamas and Fatah.​

The current purge likely targets individuals and families from all these categories, with “collaboration” serving as an elastic category that can encompass anyone who maintained contacts with Israeli, Palestinian Authority, Egyptian, or international actors during the war. The fierce battles reported between clans and Hamas likely involve families seeking to protect specific members from arrest, retaliation for honor killings, or attempts by clan-based militias to carve out protected spaces.​

The Power Vacuum Problem: Why Disarmament Without Alternatives Guarantees Chaos

A critical challenge that Western policymakers consistently overlook is that disarming Hamas without establishing credible alternative security arrangements would create conditions for even greater instability. The security architecture in Gaza is fundamentally fractured, with multiple armed groups ready to exploit any vacuum in authority. The October 7 attack was not solely Hamas’s operation—it involved Palestinian Islamic Jihad and other militant factions backed by Iranian proxies from Lebanon to Yemen.​

Israel has explicitly opposed transferring Gaza’s administration to the Palestinian Authority, viewing the PA as weak, corrupt, and incapable of maintaining security even in the West Bank, where terrorist groups remain largely disarmed through a combination of Israeli military operations and PA security cooperation. Yet aside from Hamas, no other organization possesses the authority, infrastructure, or credibility to govern Gaza.​

The historical precedents for successful disarmament are instructive. In Northern Ireland, the IRA’s decommissioning occurred within a comprehensive political settlement that addressed core grievances and provided alternative pathways to political power. In Iraq, when coalition forces dismantled Saddam Hussein’s security apparatus without establishing effective alternatives, the resulting power vacuum enabled the rise of sectarian militias and eventually ISIS. The lesson is clear: disarmament must be accompanied by legitimate alternative security provision and political representation.​

During the two years of war in Gaza, Israel did not attempt to cordon off secure areas where civilians could live free from Hamas influence—a stark contrast to successful counterinsurgency campaigns against groups like ISIS in Mosul, where Iraqi forces systematically liberated territory and enabled civilian returns to Hamas-free zones. Instead, Israeli evacuation orders directed civilians into areas still controlled by Hamas, essentially cementing the group’s authority over the population.​

Reconstruction, Governance, and the Impossibility of Normal Life Under Hamas

The human toll of two years of war has been staggering. With much of Gaza’s infrastructure destroyed, approximately 2 million people face years of reconstruction amid economic devastation, environmental collapse, and persistent insecurity. International estimates suggest reconstruction will require a decade or more and billions of dollars in investment. By the time Gaza is rebuilt, its population will likely be higher, requiring even more resources and more robust infrastructure.​

Yet none of this reconstruction or development can proceed sustainably while Hamas retains control. Since Hamas seized Gaza in 2007, the territory has experienced near-continuous conflict—wars in 2008-2009, 2012, 2014, 2021, and 2023-2025, along with regular border skirmishes and rocket attacks. This pattern reflects Hamas’s ideological commitment to ongoing resistance and its organizational dependence on perpetual conflict to maintain legitimacy, justify authoritarian rule, mobilize resources from external sponsors, and prevent internal challenges.​

For Gazans to live normal lives—to rebuild homes, start businesses, educate children, plan for the future—they require not just physical infrastructure but political stability and security guarantees. Hamas’s governance model makes this impossible. The organization’s legitimacy derives from armed resistance; peace would eliminate its raison d’être. This is why every ceasefire eventually collapses, why reconstruction efforts are repeatedly destroyed, and why Gaza remains trapped in cycles of violence and deprivation.​

Expert Analysis and the Failure of Phase II

Experts on Palestinian society, terrorism studies, and Middle Eastern political dynamics have long warned that Hamas’s participation in ceasefires does not reflect organizational transformation but rather tactical adaptation. Several factors make the collapse of Phase II and resumption of conflict virtually inevitable:​

• Hamas’s Organizational Imperatives: As an insurgent government that combines territorial control with ongoing resistance struggle, Hamas requires perpetual conflict to maintain legitimacy, justify authoritarian governance, mobilize resources from external sponsors (Iran, Qatar, Turkey), and prevent internal challenges. Disarmament would eliminate Hamas’s raison d’être and leave it vulnerable to rival Palestinian factions or internal coups.​

• The Myth of Hamas Moderation: Western policymakers repeatedly mistake tactical pragmatism for strategic moderation. Hamas has demonstrated flexibility in ceasefire timing, prisoner exchanges, and even temporary cooperation with Israel on specific issues (electricity, medical access), but this pragmatism operates within an unchanged strategic framework: the elimination of Israel and establishment of an Islamic Palestinian state. As per Hamas’s ideology, the organization has never renounced its founding charter’s ultimate goals, despite tactical evolution.​

• Israel’s Anticipation of Resumed Conflict: Israeli military and intelligence communities understood that any ceasefire would prompt Hamas to launch internal consolidation through purges. This expectation is built into Israeli security planning and explains the skepticism with which they greeted the ceasefire agreement. Israel’s strategy appears to be allowing Hamas to reveal its true nature to international observers while preparing for renewed military operations when the ceasefire inevitably collapses.​

• International Community’s Structural Naivety: Western governments and international organizations consistently approach Middle Eastern conflicts with frameworks derived from European peace processes—Northern Ireland, the Balkans—that assume rational actors pursuing normal political goods (territory, resources, recognition) who can be incentivized toward compromise. This framework fails catastrophically when applied to actors like Hamas for whom armed resistance is a religious obligation, territorial control is secondary to ideological victory, and sumud (steadfastness) is valued above material welfare.​

Understanding Hamas’s Cultural Logic

From a sociological and anthropological perspective, Hamas’s current violence must be understood within the cultural logic of Palestinian society and the specific history of clan-state relations in Gaza. The organization operates at the intersection of multiple normative systems: Islamic law (sharia), customary tribal law (‘urf), Palestinian nationalist ideology, and modern insurgent governance practices​

Hamas’s genius—and this must be acknowledged even as we condemn its methods—has been synthesizing these systems into a coherent governance framework that resonates with Gaza’s conservative, kinship-oriented society. The executions of “collaborators” can be read through multiple cultural scripts simultaneously: as Islamic justice against traitors to the umma (community of believers), as restoration of collective honor within the hamula system, as punishment for betraying the national struggle, and as modern counterintelligence operations against security threats.​

This cultural competency explains Hamas’s resilience despite economic devastation, military losses, and international isolation. The organization has successfully embedded itself within Gaza’s social fabric in ways that purely coercive rule could not sustain for eighteen years. The 84% of Gazans who expect fair treatment from the ‘urf system (versus 56% from formal courts) are not expressing support for Hamas per se, but for traditional institutions that Hamas has successfully colonized and instrumentalized.​ Understanding this cultural dimension is essential for policymakers who must confront the reality that removing Hamas requires not just military defeat but also providing alternative institutions that can fulfill the social functions Hamas has captured—dispute resolution, security provision, welfare distribution, and identity affirmation.​

The Impossibility of Peaceful Coexistence and the Logic of Destruction

The emerging consensus among terrorism studies experts, Middle East analysts, and specialists in Palestinian society is stark: there is no path to sustainable peace that includes Hamas as a political actor. This conclusion, often dismissed by conflict resolution theorists as hawkish or lacking imagination, derives from clear-eyed analysis of Hamas’s ideology, organizational structure, and demonstrated behavior over two decades.​ The current purge demonstrates that Hamas views the ceasefire not as a foundation for peace but as an opportunity to eliminate potential alternatives to its rule. The organization is preparing for resumed conflict by consolidating internal control, eliminating potential quislings or rival leaders, and demonstrating to external sponsors (Iran, Hezbollah, Houthi militants) that it remains committed to resistance.​

President Trump’s ultimatum, while rhetorically forceful, reflects a fundamental misunderstanding: Hamas will not voluntarily disarm because disarmament equals organizational suicide. The only historical precedents for successful disarmament of ideologically committed insurgent governments involve either:​

1. Military defeat so comprehensive that the organization ceases to exist as a coherent entity (analogous to the Tamil Tigers’ final defeat in Sri Lanka).​
2. Negotiated settlements where the insurgent organization achieves its core political objectives and transitions into conventional politics (analogous to the IRA/Sinn Féin in Northern Ireland or FRELIMO in Mozambique).​

Neither condition applies to Hamas. Israel has not achieved complete military victory, and Hamas’s core objectives (elimination of Israel, Islamic state in historic Palestine) are non-negotiable for Israel and unacceptable to the international community.​

Some observers point to cases like the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), which ostensibly committed to disarmament but has only performed token ceremonies of burning weapons while maintaining operational capabilities. This “disarmament theater” satisfies international mediators’ need to declare progress while preserving the organization’s military power—precisely the outcome Hamas would pursue if forced into a disarmament process.​

Toward a Realistic Framework: The Necessity of Hamas’s Complete Dismantlement

The evidence presented—from anthropological studies of Gaza’s clan structures to analysis of sumud ideology to Hamas’s demonstrated behavior during this ceasefire—points to an unavoidable conclusion: sustainable security and any possibility of Palestinian self-governance require Hamas’s complete destruction as a military and political organization.​

This conclusion is not ideological preference but analytical necessity derived from multiple disciplinary perspectives:

• From Terrorism Studies: Hamas exhibits all characteristics of organizations that cannot be reformed or integrated into peaceful politics—apocalyptic ideology, religious justification for violence, organizational structures dependent on perpetual conflict, and external sponsorship from states committed to regional destabilization.​

• From Political Science: Hamas’s governance model represents “authoritarian durability” achieved through combination of coercion, ideological hegemony, and institutional capture. Such regimes do not voluntarily liberalize; they must be removed.​

• From Anthropology: Hamas has successfully colonized Gaza’s kinship institutions, making the organization’s removal extraordinarily difficult without triggering clan warfare. However, the alternative—accepting Hamas’s permanent rule—condemns Gaza’s population to perpetual conflict, economic devastation, and authoritarian governance.​

• From International Relations: The current ceasefire and purge demonstrate the failure of conflict resolution approaches based on gradualism, confidence-building measures, and incentive structures. Hamas does not respond to these incentives because its objectives are incommensurable with the frameworks of negotiated settlement.​

• From Middle East Studies: The concept of sumud and the integration of armed resistance into Palestinian identity mean that Hamas’s disarmament would be perceived not as peace but as capitulation, eliminating the organization’s legitimacy and precipitating internal collapse or replacement by even more radical elements.​

A Pathway Forward: Comprehensive Dismantlement and Governance Transition

Any realistic path toward stability in Gaza requires acknowledging uncomfortable truths and accepting significant costs and risks. The international community, particularly Western governments, must abandon the comforting fiction that Hamas can be persuaded, incentivized, or cajoled into peaceful coexistence. The executions occurring in Gaza’s streets are not aberrations that peace processes can overcome; they are revelations of Hamas’s fundamental nature and strategic logic.​

Phase II of any peace plan will fail because Hamas does not seek peace—it seeks tactical breathing space to consolidate, rearm, and prepare for renewed conflict. President Trump’s ultimatum, while politically satisfying, is strategically meaningless without military capability and political will to follow through on the threat. The only realistic path forward requires:​

• Complete Military Dismantlement: Hamas’s armed capabilities must be eliminated through sustained military operations that target not just heavy weapons but also command structures, weapons manufacturing facilities, tunnel networks, and military personnel.​
• Removal of Political and Administrative Structures: Hamas’s governance apparatus—ministries, security services, courts, welfare institutions—must be dismantled and replaced, not merely reformed or rebranded.​

• International Transitional Administration: Given that neither Israel nor the Palestinian Authority can credibly govern Gaza in the immediate post-Hamas period, an international administration backed by Arab states (Egypt, Saudi Arabia, UAE) and major powers may be necessary to provide security, humanitarian assistance, and governance during reconstruction.​

• Empowerment of Alternative Palestinian Leadership: Simultaneous with Hamas’s removal, alternative Palestinian leaders—whether from reformed Fatah elements, independent civil society, clan-based traditional authorities, or new political movements—must be identified, protected, and empowered to provide legitimate governance that accepts Israel’s existence and renounces armed resistance.​

• Massive Reconstruction Investment Tied to Demilitarization: The billions of dollars required for Gaza’s reconstruction must be explicitly conditioned on complete demilitarization, political reform, and acceptance of long-term security monitoring. This investment should focus not just on physical infrastructure but on creating economic opportunities that provide alternatives to militant recruitment.​

• Regional Security Architecture: Gaza’s future must be integrated into broader regional security arrangements involving Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, with explicit guarantees against rearmament and mechanisms for addressing legitimate Palestinian grievances through non-violent means.​

This path is arduous, costly, and offers no guarantee of success. It requires sustained military operations that will cause additional civilian casualties and destruction. It demands long-term international commitment of resources and personnel. It risks clan warfare, the emergence of even more radical groups, or Palestinian rejection of externally imposed governance. But it is the only approach consistent with the evidence about Hamas’s ideology, organizational structure, and demonstrated behavior. The alternative—accepting Hamas’s continued rule in exchange for temporary ceasefires—guarantees perpetual conflict, continued suffering for Gaza’s population, and permanent insecurity for Israel and the region.​

Breaking the Cycle of Illusion

The blood flowing in Gaza’s streets today is not the tragic byproduct of failed peace but the inevitable result of allowing an ideologically committed terrorist organization to consolidate territorial control. For eighteen years, the international community has oscillated between military campaigns to “degrade” Hamas and diplomatic initiatives to “moderate” the organization, achieving neither objective.​ Western policymakers must recognize that their frameworks for understanding conflict resolution—derived from contexts where rational actors pursued negotiable objectives—do not apply to Hamas. This is not a territorial dispute that can be resolved through land swaps, nor a political conflict that can be addressed through power-sharing arrangements, nor an economic problem that can be solved through development assistance.​

Hamas represents a revolutionary Islamist movement for which armed resistance is both religious obligation and organizational identity, for which sumud (steadfastness) is valued above material welfare, and for which the elimination of Israel remains the non-negotiable ultimate objective. No amount of diplomatic creativity or economic incentives will transform such an organization into a peaceful partner.​ The executions, the purges, the “fierce battles between clans and the terrorist group” that the user describes are not temporary aberrations during a difficult transition but structural features of Hamas’s governance model. They will continue, in various forms, as long as Hamas retains power. Phase II will fail not because of implementation problems or lack of good faith but because it is premised on a fundamental misunderstanding of the actor it seeks to transform.​

There is only one answer to this reality: the complete destruction of Hamas as a military and political organization, coupled with massive international investment in alternative governance structures, economic reconstruction, and security provision. This path is difficult and dangerous, but it is the only one that offers genuine hope for sustainable peace and the possibility that Gaza’s children might one day live normal lives, free from the cycle of violence that has defined their parents’ and grandparents’ existence.​ Until the international community—and particularly Western governments—accepts this reality and commits to the difficult work of comprehensive transformation rather than comfortable illusions of negotiated compromise, Gaza will remain trapped in an endless cycle of ceasefire, consolidation, and renewed conflict. The current purge is merely the latest iteration of a pattern that will repeat indefinitely until Hamas’s power is broken