The Ultimate Betrayal of 9/11 Victims and America’s War on Terror
The announcement that Ahmed al-Sharaa, the former Abu Mohammad al-Jolani and erstwhile emir of Jabhat al-Nusra, will address the United Nations General Assembly on September 24, 2025 represents a profound betrayal of the foundational principles underlying the post-September 11 International order. This unprecedented invitation, occurring precisely twenty-four years after the attacks that catalyzed the global war on terror, epitomizes the institutional failure of the United Nations to maintain coherent counter-terrorism policies and exposes the fundamental contradictions within contemporary international law regarding state recognition and legitimacy.
The nexus between al-Sharaa’s political metamorphosis and the broader doxa of international counter-terrorism reveals the extent to which the UN system has abandoned its core mandate to prevent terrorism and protect international peace and security. His scheduled appearance at the General Assembly, marking the first Syrian presidential presence since Nureddin al-Atassi in 1967, constitutes not merely a diplomatic milestone but a categorical repudiation of decades of American sacrifice in the fight against terrorism. al-Sharaa’s UN invitation represents the culmination of systemic institutional failures within the international community’s counter-terrorism apparatus, demonstrating how political expediency has superseded principled engagement with terrorist-designated entities.
The Nexus of Terrorism and International Law
The international legal framework governing terrorism has consistently struggled with definitional ambiguities and enforcement mechanisms, creating lacunae that actors like al-Sharaa have systematically exploited. The absence of a universally accepted definition of terrorism within international law has enabled the transformation of designated terrorist organisations into recognised political entities through strategic rebranding and diplomatic engagement (Cassese, 2006; Saul, 2006).
Al-Sharaa’s trajectory from al-Qaeda affiliate to UN-invited head of state exemplifies the definitional elasticity that has characterized post-9/11 counter-terrorism efforts. His organisation, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, emerged from the merger of multiple jihadist factions in 2017, yet successfully shed its Foreign Terrorist Organisation (FTO) designation through calculated political manoeuvering rather than substantive ideological transformation. The US State Department’s July 2025 decision to revoke HTS’s FTO status illustrates how bureaucratic expedience can override counterterrorism imperatives when geopolitical interests align.
The UNSC Resolution 1373, adopted in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, mandated comprehensive counterterrorism measures while deliberately avoiding definitional precision. This strategic ambiguity, initially intended to facilitate broad international cooperation, has instead enabled states to manipulate terrorism designations according to political convenience. The resolution’s requirement that states “refrain from providing any form of support, active or passive, to entities or persons involved in terrorist acts” appears fundamentally incompatible with extending diplomatic recognition to former jihadist leaders. Furthermore, the International Court of Justice’s jurisprudence on state responsibility for terrorism, particularly in cases such as Nicaragua v. United States and Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo, establishes clear precedents regarding state obligations to prevent and suppress terrorism (Shaw, 2017). The UN’s accommodation of al-Sharaa’s presence violates these established principles by legitimising an entity with documented links to al-Qaeda and other proscribed organisations.
The procedural complexities surrounding al-Sharaa’s UN invitation exemplify the institutional contradictions within international counterterrorism frameworks. While the standard protocol for removing terrorist designations requires Security Council action, diplomatic sources indicate that “some members were set to drag their feet to extract concessions from other countries backing Syria’s new authorities”. The United States’ preemptive issuance of travel waivers in late August circumvented these multilateral processes, effectively enabling unilateral diplomatic accommodation of a designated terrorist entity. This procedural manipulation demonstrates how bureaucratic expedience can override established counterterrorism mechanisms when geopolitical interests align, fundamentally undermining the integrity of international sanctions regimes.
The UN Counter-Terrorism Doxa: Twenty-Four Years of Institutional Failure
The UN counter-terrorism architecture, constructed in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, has proven catastrophically inadequate in addressing the evolving nature of transnational terrorism. The establishment of multiple overlapping institutions – including the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (2005), the Office of Counter-Terrorism (2017), and various subsidiary bodies – has created a fragmented bureaucracy characterized by jurisdictional confusion and strategic incoherence.
Take the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, adopted in 2006 and regularly updated, that purports to provide a comprehensive framework for international cooperation against terrorism. However, empirical analysis of its implementation reveals significant gaps between rhetorical commitment and operational effectiveness. The strategy’s four-pillar approach – addressing conditions conducive to terrorism, preventing and combating terrorism, building state capacity, and ensuring human rights compliance – has failed to prevent the mainstreaming of former terrorist entities into legitimate political structures. The Office of Counter-Terrorism, established under Secretary-General Guterres, was explicitly tasked with coordinating “all of UN” approaches to counterterrorism. Yet its accommodation of al-Sharaa’s UN appearance demonstrates the organisation’s abandonment of principled counterterrorism in favour of pragmatic political accommodation. This represents a fundamental betrayal of the institutional mandate established following the September 11 attacks.
The symbolic dimension of al-Sharaa’s UN debut reveals the extent to which diplomatic theatre has superseded substantive counterterrorism evaluation. How come the new government in Damascus gets to have a seat at the UN General Assembly? Has it somehow magically gained the backing of all P5 members of the UN Security Council? This “magical” transformation from designated terrorist organisation to internationally recognized government within months demonstrates the UN system’s abandonment of principled counterterrorism standards. The willingness of P5 members to facilitate this diplomatic accommodation without credible guarantees regarding Syria’s future counterterrorism commitments represents a categorical failure of institutional memory regarding post-9/11 counterterrorism imperatives. Quantitative analysis of UN counterterrorism effectiveness reveals disturbing trends in global terrorism patterns. Despite $8 trillion in US counterterrorism expenditure since 2001, domestic terrorism in the United States has increased by 357 percent, while international terrorist networks have metastasized rather than diminished. The Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan, the resurgence of ISIS-K, and the normalisation of former al-Qaeda affiliates like HTS demonstrate the comprehensive failure of UN-coordinated counterterrorism efforts.
The UN Security Council’s sanctions regime, theoretically designed to prevent terrorist financing and movement, has been systematically undermined through exemptions and diplomatic accommodations. Al-Sharaa’s travel exemption to attend the General Assembly exemplifies how the UN system’s own procedures can be weaponised to legitimise terrorist-linked entities. This procedural manipulation represents a profound violation of the sanctions regime’s integrity and purpose.
Syria-US Relations: Historical Context and Contemporary Betrayal
The invitation of a Syrian president to address the UN for the first time since 1967 must be understood within the broader historical context of Syrian-American diplomatic relations and their systematic deterioration following the Six-Day War. Syria’s consistent designation as a state sponsor of terrorism since 1979, maintained across multiple American administrations regardless of political affiliation, reflects bipartisan recognition of the Syrian regime’s role in destabilising regional security. The severing of diplomatic relations in 1967 followed Syria’s alignment with Soviet interests during the Cold War and its rejection of American-mediated peace processes. The restoration of relations in 1974 proved ephemeral, as Syria’s continued support for Palestinian militant organisations and its facilitation of terrorist networks maintained fundamental antagonism with American interests. The Ba’athist regime’s role in enabling foreign fighter flows to Iraq during the 2003-2011 period further cemented Syria’s position as a primary state sponsor of terrorism. Al-Sharaa’s presence in New York represents the first time since 1967 that a Syrian resident has been granted such extensive access to American territory and institutions. This development constitutes a categorical betrayal of the American people, particularly the families of the 4,431 American service members killed in Iraq, many by foreign fighters who transited through Syria with the Assad regime’s tacit approval (Cordesman, 2018). The symbolic significance of this invitation, occurring on the twenty-fourth anniversary of 9/11, compounds the affront to American national memory and sacrifice.
The geopolitical implications of normalising relations with al-Sharaa’s government extend beyond bilateral Syrian-American concerns to encompass broader regional stability. Syria’s strategic location at the intersection of multiple conflict zones, its role as a conduit for Iranian influence projection, and its function as a base for various proxy forces make Syrian policy a crucial determinant of regional security architecture (Hinnebusch, 2020). The premature legitimisation of al-Sharaa’s authority undermines American leverage in shaping Syria’s post-Assad trajectory and potentially enables the reconstruction of authoritarian governance structures. Furthermore, the historical pattern of Syrian diplomatic engagement reveals consistent instrumentalisation of international forums to advance revisionist regional objectives. Syria’s utilisation of Arab League and UN platforms to delegitimise Israeli existence, support Palestinian terrorism, and advocate for the destruction of the regional status quo provides crucial context for evaluating al-Sharaa’s UN appearance. The absence of credible guarantees regarding Syria’s future foreign policy orientation renders the current diplomatic accommodation fundamentally premature.
The Al-Sharaa Phenomenon: From Jihadist to Statesman
Ahmed al-Sharaa’s ideological and strategic evolution from Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, a dedicated al-Qaeda operative, to internationally recognised statesman represents a paradigmatic case study in the malleability of terrorist identity within contemporary international relations. His biographical trajectory, from Iraqi insurgent (2003-2006) through Syrian jihadist leader (2012-2024) to transitional president (2025-present), illuminates the mechanisms through which designated terrorist entities achieve political legitimacy. Al-Sharaa’s formation of Jabhat al-Nusra in 2012 with explicit al-Qaeda backing positioned him as a central figure within the global jihadist network. His organisation’s systematic employment of suicide bombing, hostage-taking, and sectarian violence against Syrian civilians established clear patterns of terrorist methodology consistent with international legal definitions. The group’s 2013 pledge of allegiance to al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri further cemented its position within the transnational jihadist framework.
The strategic rebranding process that transformed al-Nusra into Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham involved calculated distancing from al-Qaeda rhetoric while maintaining operational continuity with previous terrorist practices. This transformation represents a sophisticated exercise in political theatre rather than genuine ideological moderation. Al-Sharaa’s 2016 announcement severing ties with al-Qaeda coincided with intensified international pressure and demonstrated tactical flexibility rather than strategic transformation. The establishment of the Syrian Salvation Government in Idlib province provided al-Sharaa with crucial experience in governance and administration, enabling his transformation from military commander to political leader. However, this transition occurred within the context of continued counterterrorism operations against his organisation and persistent international sanctions. The SSG’s authoritarian governance practices, including suppression of dissent and restrictions on civil society, prefigured the challenges facing Syria’s post-Assad transition. Al-Sharaa’s successful capture of Damascus in December 2024 through an eleven-day offensive demonstrated remarkable military capabilities but also revealed the continued centrality of armed force in his political methodology. His assumption of presidential authority without democratic legitimation or constitutional foundation raises fundamental questions about the legal basis for international recognition. The international community’s acceptance of his authority based solely on military success establishes dangerous precedents for the legitimisation of armed non-state actors.
The transformation from terrorist leader to international statesman has been facilitated by strategic communications and image management. Al-Sharaa’s adoption of civilian attire, moderation of rhetorical tone, and engagement with international media represent calculated efforts to rehabilitate his international image. However, these cosmetic changes mask underlying continuities in authoritarian governance practices and the absence of credible democratic institutions. Al-Sharaa’s domestic governance record since assuming power reveals troubling continuities with authoritarian practices despite international diplomatic recognition. Syrian civil society activists charge that “Al-Sharaa’s rule has so far been too focused on the diplomatic stage at the expense of internal reforms,” with government institutions demonstrably unable to function effectively. One Syrian analyst reported that “when I go to an institution, and I ask about something, they don’t have answers”. This institutional dysfunction, combined with persistent sectarian violence under al-Sharaa’s authority, contradicts international assumptions regarding his government’s capacity for effective governance and democratic transition.
The persistent sectarian violence under al-Sharaa’s authority provides compelling evidence of his government’s failure to establish effective governance or protect minority communities. UN investigations documented that Syrian forces killed approximately 1,400 people, mostly civilians, in predominantly Alawite areas during March 2025, with government troops also involved in massacres within Druze-dominated provinces. These systematic attacks, characterized by summary executions based on sectarian identity, demonstrate the absence of institutional control over security forces and the persistence of jihadist methodologies within al-Sharaa’s governance structure. The targeting of religious minorities through “gunmen showing up at civilians’ doors, interrogating them by asking whether they are Alawite or Sunni, and then targeting and killing them based solely on their response” represents a continuation of terrorist tactics under the guise of governmental authority.
Legal and Normative Implications of UN Recognition
The UN accommodation of al-Sharaa’s presence at the General Assembly raises profound questions regarding the organisation’s legal competence and normative consistency in matters of state recognition and counterterrorism. Under international law, the UN lacks the authority to grant or withdraw state recognition, which remains the prerogative of individual member states. However, the organisation’s procedural decisions regarding diplomatic access and speaking privileges carry significant symbolic and practical implications for international legitimacy. The UN Charter’s provisions regarding the maintenance of international peace and security, particularly Article 1’s commitment to “suppress acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace,” appear fundamentally incompatible with extending diplomatic courtesies to individuals with documented terrorist affiliations. The organisation’s decision to grant al-Sharaa a travel exemption from existing sanctions represents a procedural circumvention of its own counterterrorism obligations.
The precedent established by al-Sharaa’s UN invitation creates troubling implications for future international engagement with terrorist-linked entities. If former al-Qaeda affiliates can achieve UN recognition through military success and strategic rebranding, the organisation’s counterterrorism credibility faces existential challenges. This development potentially encourages other designated terrorist organisations to pursue similar strategies of political transformation without genuine ideological moderation.
The doctrine of state continuity in international law provides additional analytical framework for evaluating Syria’s representation at the UN. Al-Sharaa’s government lacks clear constitutional foundation and democratic legitimacy, raising questions about its legal competence to represent the Syrian state. The absence of transitional justice mechanisms or accountability for previous terrorist activities further complicates the legal basis for international recognition. The International Criminal Court’s jurisdiction (ICC) over war crimes and crimes against humanity potentially encompasses actions taken by al-Sharaa during his tenure as a jihadist leader. The UN accommodation of his presence while ICC investigations remain pending creates uncomfortable tensions between international legal institutions. This institutional fragmentation undermines the coherence of the international legal system’s response to terrorism and atrocity crimes.
The appointment of Ibrahim Olabi as Syria’s new UN ambassador illuminates the strategic sophistication underlying al-Sharaa’s diplomatic rehabilitation campaign. Olabi, a British-trained barrister with extensive human rights credentials and Western education, represents a calculated effort to present al-Sharaa’s government as technocratically competent and internationally oriented. Born to Syrian exiles and educated at Manchester and Oxford universities, Olabi embodies the diaspora intellectual class whose involvement legitimises the transition government in Western diplomatic circles. However, his appointment also highlights the extent to which al-Sharaa’s government relies on externally educated elites rather than indigenous democratic institutions, raising questions about the authentic representativeness of the new Syrian administration.
Towards a Renewed Framework of International Accountability
Ahmed al-Sharaa’s invitation to address the UN General Assembly twenty-four years after September 11 represents the nadir of international counterterrorism efforts and exposes the fundamental bankruptcy of existing institutional frameworks for addressing transnational terrorism. This development demonstrates how political expedience and strategic accommodation have superseded principled engagement with terrorist-designated entities, creating dangerous precedents for future international relations.
The systematic failure of UN counterterrorism architecture reflects deeper structural problems within international organisations and their capacity to maintain coherent policies across changing geopolitical circumstances. The organisation’s transformation from a principled advocate for counterterrorism into an accommodating platform for former terrorist leaders represents a categorical abandonment of its post-9/11 mandate. The implications of this betrayal extend far beyond Syrian-American relations to encompass fundamental questions about international order, legal consistency, and institutional credibility. The normalisation of al-Sharaa’s authority without credible guarantees regarding democratic governance, minority protection, or counterterrorism cooperation establishes dangerous precedents that will reverberate across multiple conflict zones. The path forward requires comprehensive institutional reform within UN counterterrorism structures, including clearer definitional frameworks for terrorism, enhanced accountability mechanisms for sanctions violations, and improved coordination between legal and political institutions. The international community must recommit to principled engagement with terrorist-linked entities that prioritises substantive transformation over cosmetic rebranding.
Most fundamentally, this case demonstrates the urgent need for renewed American leadership in international counterterrorism efforts. The Biden and Trump administrations’ premature accommodation of al-Sharaa’s authority reflects broader strategic confusion regarding America’s global counterterrorism objectives. Future American policy must prioritise long-term strategic coherence over short-term diplomatic expedience in addressing the Syrian transition.
The memory of 9/11 and the sacrifice of thousands of American service members in subsequent counterterrorism operations demands nothing less than principled resistance to the mainstreaming of terrorist-linked entities into legitimate international institutions. Al-Sharaa’s UN invitation represents not diplomatic progress but institutional failure of the highest order, requiring immediate corrective action to preserve the integrity of international counterterrorism efforts.
The clock is ticking…loud and clear.
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