Historical Foundations and Contemporary Networks
On September 27, 2025, pro-Hamas organizations converged in Cape Town, South Africa, for a march and rally that highlighted the deep-rooted connections between the Palestinian militant group and South African support networks. The event, which featured inflammatory rhetoric including chants of “Viva Hamas” and declarations that participants were “all Hamas,” represents the latest manifestation of relationships that have been cultivating for decades since Hamas’s founding in 1987.
Historical Context: Hamas’s Early Expansion to South Africa
Hamas, formally established in December 1987 during the First Intifada by Sheikh Ahmed Yassin as the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, began extending its influence internationally almost immediately after its founding. South Africa became a key target for Hamas outreach due to several converging factors that created fertile ground for the organization’s operations. The timing of Hamas’s formation coincided with South Africa’s own liberation struggle against apartheid, creating natural ideological affinities between Palestinian and South African resistance movements. The African National Congress (ANC) and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) had already established solidarity ties dating back to the 1950s and 1960s, with both movements viewing themselves as engaged in anti-colonial struggles against oppressive regimes.
By the late 1980s and early 1990s, as Hamas was establishing itself in the Palestinian territories, South African Islamic organizations were simultaneously undergoing political radicalization. Groups like Qibla, founded in Cape Town in 1980 and inspired by Iran’s Islamic Revolution, had already demonstrated that South African Muslim communities could be mobilized around international Islamic causes. The Muslim Youth Movement, which emerged in the early 1980s, specifically formed the Palestine Islamic Solidarity Committee (Paliscom) to focus on Palestinian issues. This political infrastructure provided Hamas with ready-made networks and sympathetic audiences when it began expanding its operations beyond the Palestinian territories in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
Organizational Infrastructure: The Al-Quds Foundation Network
Central to Hamas’s South African operations has been the establishment of charitable and religious organizations that serve as conduits for fundraising and ideological support. The Al-Quds Foundation of South Africa (AQFSA), established in the early 2000s as a branch of the Lebanon-based Al-Quds International Foundation, became the primary vehicle for Hamas activities in the country. The international Al-Quds Foundation was established in Beirut in 2001 by Hamas members specifically to raise funds for the organization through charitable activities. The U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned the international foundation in 2012, determining it was controlled by Hamas and featured several senior Hamas leaders on its board. However, the South African branch has remained unsanctioned, allowing it to operate freely within the country’s banking system.
Leadership of these organizations has been dominated by figures with direct Hamas connections. Ebrahim Gabriels, who has served as president of both the Al-Quds Foundation South Africa and the Muslim Judicial Council, has maintained extensive personal relationships with Hamas leadership for over two decades. He has met with Hamas officials in Damascus in 2009, Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Gaza in 2011, and politburo members in South Africa in 2017. A 2021 Arabic-language biography of Hamas leader Mousa Abu Marzouk specifically identified Gabriels as Abu Marzouk’s “gateway to South Africa’s Muslim community”.
Institutional Partnerships: The ANC Connection
The relationship between Hamas and South Africa’s ruling African National Congress extends back to the organization’s early years. Shortly after Hamas won Palestinian parliamentary elections in 2006, ANC-led South Africa became one of the few countries to forge ties with the Hamas-led Palestinian government. This formal recognition provided Hamas with crucial diplomatic legitimacy during a period of international isolation. The partnership deepened significantly in 2015 when ANC leaders welcomed senior Hamas officials Khaled Mashaal and Mousa Abu Marzouk for the signing of a letter of intent aimed at strengthening ties between the organizations. The visit included ANC-organized conferences where Mashaal promised continued Hamas attacks against Israel, statements that went unchallenged by South African officials. In 2018, the ANC and Hamas signed a memorandum of understanding to advance the international Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) campaign against Israel. This agreement included commitments by the ANC to work within South Africa’s parliament to downgrade diplomatic relations with Israel, a promise that was fulfilled when South Africa shuttered its embassy in Tel Aviv in 2023.
Financial Networks and Terror Financing
Hamas’s South African operations have been facilitated by a complex web of financial networks that exploit the country’s banking system. The organization has operated through multiple front organizations, including the Al-Aqsa Foundation South Africa, which was listed as a member of the Union of Good, an umbrella charity group sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury Department in 2008 for funding Hamas. Gabriels served as a board member of the Union of Good in the early 2000s, demonstrating the interconnected nature of international Hamas financing networks. Even after sanctions were imposed on related organizations, South African entities continued operating by maintaining separate legal structures while preserving operational connections to sanctioned groups.
The extent of these financial operations has drawn scrutiny from international banking compliance systems. The Al-Quds Foundation South Africa was designated as a “terror-related entity” on World-Check, a database used globally by financial institutions to identify heightened risk agents. Despite this designation, South African banks have continued providing services to Hamas-linked organizations, suggesting gaps in the country’s counterterror financing enforcement.
Contemporary Operations and Government Support
The September 27, 2025 rally demonstrated the extent to which Hamas operations in South Africa have become normalized and even officially supported. The event was led by organizations with documented Hamas ties, while ANC officials participated directly in activities featuring explicit support for terrorism. ANC First Deputy Secretary-General Nomvula Mokonyane addressed the gathering, calling for boycotts of Israel and defiantly challenging potential U.S. sanctions against ANC officials. Her presence represented official party endorsement of an event featuring Hamas propaganda and terrorist glorification. The rally organizers included figures who have maintained decades-long relationships with Hamas leadership. Riad Fataar, president of the Muslim Judicial Council, led chants of “Death to the IDF” and has previously declared “We are all Hamas”. These statements go beyond symbolic support to constitute active promotion of terrorist ideology within South African civil society.
Regional and International Implications
Hamas’s entrenchment in South Africa represents more than a bilateral relationship between a terrorist organization and sympathetic local groups. The network provides Hamas with a platform for operations across southern and eastern Africa, with Hamas representative Emad Saber serving as the organization’s director for the entire region. South Africa’s position as a regional economic hub and its membership in international organizations like the BRICS group amplify the significance of Hamas operations within its borders. The organization has leveraged South African diplomatic initiatives, including the country’s genocide case against Israel at the International Court of Justice, to advance its political objectives on global stages.
The persistence and expansion of Hamas networks in South Africa, despite international sanctions and counterterrorism efforts elsewhere, demonstrates how sympathetic government policies can provide safe havens for terrorist organizations. The September 2025 rally, featuring open Hamas support with official ANC participation, suggests these relationships are strengthening rather than diminishing over time.
The nearly four-decade presence of Hamas in South Africa, from the organization’s founding in 1987 through contemporary public rallies, illustrates how terrorist organizations can establish durable international networks when they find ideological alignment with local political movements and institutional protection from sympathetic governments.
