Turkey’s blackmail of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) over Sweden’s accession is the latest episode to raise questions about whether Turkey belongs in the alliance. Certainly, NATO leaders and many in the White House have celebrated Turkey agreeing to Swedish accession after a 22-month delay but, the reality is Turkey subordinates NATO’s interests to its own material benefit. It plays Russia and the United States off each other, and it double-deals as Turkey arms Ukraine while helping Russia evade sanctions.
NATO, established to provide collective security against threats from the Soviet Union, now faces a complex situation with one of its key members, Turkey. Indeed, NATO finds itself at a strategic crossroads with its member as Turkey’s actions have increasingly diverged from NATO’s collective objectives, and discussions about its potential expulsion have surfaced. However, expelling Turkey would require a strategic reevaluation far beyond legal considerations.
NATO’s value to Erdoğan, however, is that he can be a Trojan horse and block consensus on every decision until NATO members meet his price.
The idea that the problem will resolve itself if Erdoğan leaves office or dies is fantasy given how he has shaped the education of 32 million Turks and how he molded the military into his own image during his 21-year dictatorship. The same is true with Turkey’s media and bureaucracy. Leaving NATO is of course possible on a voluntary basis: in 1966, for example, France left NATO’s integrated military command after a series of internal disputes, although Charles De Gaulle simultaneously reaffirmed France’s commitment to the alliance’s collective defense. Eight years later, Greece withdrew from NATO command after Turkey invaded Cyprus. Both countries ultimately rejoined.
As debates intensify over Turkey’s alignment with NATO’s core values and its strategic actions, the question arises: can Turkey be expelled from NATO?This article delves into the legal, political, and strategic implications of such a decision, examining how it would affect NATO’s security architecture, regional influence, and global standing.
THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
It is important to bear in mind that NATO is not merely a community of interests, but also a community of values. Inspired by the wording of the Brussels Treaty of 1948, the preamble to the North Atlantic Treaty makes this point in the following terms:
“The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments.
They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area.
They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defense and for the preservation of peace and security. They therefore agree to this North Atlantic Treaty.”
NATO is not in unchartered territory. That the Alliance is based on a set of shared values is further underlined by Article 2 of the treaty, which commits the parties to “strengthening their free institutions” and “bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded,” as well as by Article 10, which stipulates that prospective members need to be in “a position to further the principles of this Treaty” in order to accede to it.
1.More Than a Military Alliance
Some of NATO’s founding members sought to accord these principles even greater weight. More than any other party, Canada from the very beginning wished for the North Atlantic community to be “much more than a military alliance” (Memorandum by Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, June 26, 1948, in CDER vol.14, p. 521). This desire led the Canadian government to propose that the negotiating parties should accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice for all legal disputes arising between them. Canada’s high regard for the principles of democracy, political liberty and the rule of law also led it to express misgivings over the potential membership of Portugal and Spain. In the end, the strategic reasons for inviting Portugal to join NATO as a founding member proved more compelling, while Spain acceded only later, in 1982, after democracy had been restored.
Guided by these ideals, Canada also actively pursued the idea of incorporating an expulsion clause into the draft treaty. The annex to the Washington Paper* of September 1948, which contained the first outline of the future agreement, noted the following:
The question of including a provision for disqualification under certain circumstances of any of the signatories from enjoying the benefits of the Treaty requires further consideration.
In the eyes of the Canadian government, the circumstances that might justify the disqualification of a party had to include the “coming into power of a communist-dominated government” in that state (Commentary on the Washington Paper, Dec. 6, 1948). To deal with such an eventuality, Canada proposed a draft provision entitling the North Atlantic Council to suspend or expel a member state from the privileges of membership (Draft North Atlantic Treaty, Dec. 17, 1948).
These proposals met with a lukewarm reception. The general feeling among the other negotiating parties was that it would be a mistake to include any provision in the treaty that would raise questions about the voting procedure in the Council (Canadian Ambassador in the United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs, Jan. 4, 1949, in CDER vol. 15** p. 483). The British Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, also thought that any efforts to endow the Council with conciliatory powers should be resisted:
I really do not see any advantage in disputes which we may have in the future with the Americans or indeed with the French being discussed in the open and in the presence of the Italians, the Scandinavians and the Portuguese (Mr. Bevin to U.K. Ambassador to Washington Sir O. Franks , Jan. 12, 1949, in The Brussels and North Atlantic Treaties, 1947-1949, p. 334).
The idea to incorporate some kind of suspension and expulsion mechanism into the North Atlantic Treaty was therefore dropped. But this left open the question of how NATO should deal with an ally that went “red” as a result of Soviet subversion.
2. Options Considered
In a statement to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in 1949, then-Secretary of State Dean Acheson took the view that such a nation could be booted out even in the absence of a formalized suspension and expulsion procedure. His comments on the preamble to the treaty merit quoting in full:
This draft, Mr. Chairman, starts out with a preamble, and one of the purposes of this preamble was to see if we could in some way describe a democratic non-Communist country. The purpose of that was, if, for instance, Italy becomes a member of such a treaty and then by any chance should go Communist, a question has arisen in people’s minds about what happens then. You do not want to have provisions in such a treaty saying that you can throw them out, because that indicates you are rather doubtful about them before you start; but if you can describe the sort of objectives that are shared by all of these countries, and one of them should no longer be able to be seeking those objectives, then the basis is laid for a separation.
We think that perhaps that is a little bit of a theoretical thing, because probably the first thing any country would do if it became Communist would be to get out of this. That is the way they proceed. They do not stay in. ( The Vandenberg Resolution and the North Atlantic Treaty: Hearings *** p. 93)
The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations also addressed the matter in its report on the treaty. Once again, the relevant passage is worth quoting in full:
The treaty has been criticized in some quarters because it contains no provision for expulsion or the suspension of rights of a recalcitrant member which might fail to carry out its obligations as a result, for example, of its succumbing to communism. Given the nature of the pact and the close community of interests of the signatory states, the committee believes that such a provision would be both unnecessary and inappropriate. Obviously, however, if a member persistently violates the principles contained in the pact, the other members will no longer be obligated to assist that member. Clearly it would fail “to safeguard the freedom * * *” of its people, “founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law” as set forth in the preamble, and to strengthen its “free institutions” as provided in article 2. Presumably it would also decline to participate in “mutual aid” (art. 3), and might well violate its undertakings in article 8 “not to enter into any international engagement in conflict with this treaty.” A country suffering such a fate would be in no position either to carry out its own obligations under the treaty or to expect assistance from the other parties. (The Vandenberg Resolution and the North Atlantic Treaty: Hearings, p. 379.)
The core of NATO’s founding treaty, signed in 1949, lacks specific clauses for the removal of a member, emphasizing instead the principle of collective defense and mutual security. It does not provide explicit mechanisms for suspending or expelling a member state. Demands to suspend Turkey’s membership in NATO, or to expel it from the Alliance altogether, have been made before, including in response to the political crackdown of 2016 and its decision to acquire the Russian S-400 air defence system.
Yet matters are not quite so simple.
According to international law, a member could theoretically be considered in ” material breach” of the treaty if it acts fundamentally against its principles, but this does not automatically lead to expulsion.
3 “Material Breach” under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
These passages confirm that maintaining and furthering the principles on which the Alliance is based — democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law — forms part of the object and purpose of the North Atlantic Treaty. This, in turn, suggests that a failure to comply with these principles may amount to a material breach of the treaty within the meaning of Article 60 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Pursuant to Article 60, a material breach consists of:
(a) a repudiation of the treaty not sanctioned by the present Convention; or
(b) the violation of a provision essential to the accomplishment of the object or purpose of the treaty.
To constitute a material breach pursuant to sub-paragraph (a), the violation of the principles underlying the treaty would have to be so extensive in scope, so severe and so persistent as to effectively “disavow” or repudiate the treaty (cf. Namibia Advisory Opinion**** para. 95). Turning to sub-paragraph (b), there can be little doubt that continued compliance with the values set out in the preamble and Article 2 is essential for the accomplishment of the object and purpose of the treaty.
Official statements issued by the member states, including at the Brussels Summit in 2018 and more recently on the occasion of NATO’s 70th Anniversary, repeatedly affirm these principles. A member nation that violated them in a systematic and egregious manner would thus cast doubt on the very resolve of the allies to “unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security” (preamble, North Atlantic Treaty).
Should the conditions for the existence of a material breach be satisfied, NATO’s member states would be entitled, by unanimous agreement, to suspend the operation of the treaty in whole or in part or to terminate it either in their relations with the defaulting state or among them all (Article 60(2) of the Vienna Convention). For these purposes, a unanimous decision of the North Atlantic Council, excluding the defaulting state, would suffice. No further procedural requirements apply, including those laid down in Article 65 of the Vienna Convention.
The founding instruments of many international organizations (United Nations Charter /Articles 5 and 6, the Statute of the Council of Europe/ Article 8 and the Treaty on EU/ Art 7) provide for the suspension of a member State’s rights, and even for the termination of its membership, in certain circumstances. Alas, the North Atlantic Treaty is not among them; hence no provision in the treaty foresees the suspension of membership rights, let alone the expulsion of an ally. Within NATO, concerns over the behaviour of individual allies are thus resolved primarily through diplomatic means, political pressure, and by taking a long-term view. In fact NATO leaders tend to wait out the misbehaving national leaders until a government consistent with alliance values eventually returns to power. This has not stopped speculation as to whether a nation may nevertheless be expelled from NATO and if so, how. Indeed, what are the options in the absence of a formal process for suspending or terminating membership?
- Unanimous Consent: Any decision, including a hypothetical expulsion, would require unanimous agreement among all NATO members. This means that even if all other members agreed, Turkey itself would have veto power over its removal.
- Precedents and Loopholes: Historical precedents show that NATO has dealt with problematic members through diplomacy rather than formal expulsion. For instance, during the political upheavals in Greece and Portugal, NATO opted for informal sanctions or exclusion from certain activities rather than outright expulsion.
Whether or not Turkey is in material breach of its commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty is therefore a question to be determined by the other members of the Council. But one could consider that Operation ‘Peace Spring’ constitutes a manifest violation of the prohibition of the use of force. Coupled with President Erdoğan’s threat to “open the gates” for Syrian refugees to migrate to Europe, a threat fundamentally at odds with the unity and solidarity of the Alliance, characterizing these developments as a material breach is not entirely far-fetched.
In any event, they entitle other NATO nations to suspend or scale back their military cooperation with Turkey, even without declaring Turkey to be in material breach. Although Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty commits the parties to maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack, this obligation is meant to pursue the objectives of the treaty. The duty to develop military capabilities and to cooperate to this end therefore does not override the commitment to further the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. A number of Allies, including France, Germany and Norway, as well as official NATO partner Finland, are reported to have suspended the sale of military equipment to Turkey.
POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS
Expelling Turkey would not only be a legal conundrum but also a strategic disaster for NATO due to Turkey’s geopolitical importance:
- Strategic Location: Turkey’s location at the crossroads of Europe, Asia, and the Middle East is invaluable. Turkey controls the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles straits, a critical chokepoint for naval access to the Black Sea; it also shares borders with several volatile regions, making it a pivotal ally in NATO’s defense strategy. This strategic chokepoint affects energy routes from the Caspian to Europe; therefore expulsion would mean a significant strategic setback for NATO losing this leverage in energy security and naval strategy.
The energy routes from the Caspian to Europe are a complex web of pipelines, maritime transport, and proposed projects aimed at diversifying Europe’s energy supply, especially in light of geopolitical tensions and the need for energy security.
- Military Strength: With the 2nd largest military in NATO, Turkey’s contribution to collective defense cannot be easily dismissed. Providing significant capabilities in air, land, and naval operations, Turkey’s airbases, especially Incirlik, have been pivotal for NATO’s operations in the Middle East.
- Intelligence and Surveillance : Turkey hosts several key intelligence and surveillance assets for NATO, including drone operations, and signal intelligence. Losing these would blind NATO in critical areas.
- Relations with Russia: Turkey’s increasingly complex relationship with Russia, including the purchase of Russian S-400 missiles, has raised concerns, but it also demonstrates Turkey’s strategic value in balancing powers.
- Counterterrorism efforts: Despite criticisms, Turkey has been a frontline state in the fight against terrorism in regions like Syria, offering NATO a presence where Western troops might not be welcome.
THE POLITICAL QUAGMIRE
- Diplomatic Fallout: Expelling Turkey could lead to significant diplomatic fallout, potentially pushing Turkey closer to Russia or even China, diminishing NATO’s influence in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. It could also make it an unpredictable actor in Middle Eastern politics. Without Turkey, NATO’s ability to monitor and react to Russian naval activities in the Black Sea would be severely compromised. Turkey’s military withdrawal from NATO operations would create a power vacuum in the Middle East that might be filled by less predictable or hostile forces, or increased Iranian and Russian presence in the region. Therefore, while some opinion pieces call for Turkey’s expulsion due to its actions in Syria, Cyprus, and its stance on terrorism, the broader sentiment within NATO countries recognizes Turkey’s strategic necessity.
- Internal NATO Dynamics: The move could fracture NATO’s unity, with members like Greece, who have historical tensions with Turkey, potentially supporting such a move, while others might see it as too risky.
Possible Alternatives to Expulsion
Given the legal and political hurdles, NATO might consider containing Turkey’s divergent actions while maintaining influence through economic, military, and diplomatic means.
- Sanctions and Exclusion: Limiting Turkey’s participation in certain NATO activities or intelligence sharing as a form of sanction. Engaging Turkey in operations where its participation aligns with NATO’s objectives while excluding it from others where it might be counterproductive.
- Strengthening other alliances: NATO could bolster relationships with other regional players like Greece, Cyprus, or even non-NATO countries in the Middle East like Israel, Egypt or Saudi Arabia to counterbalance any negative fallout from Turkey’s actions and compensate for Turkey’s strategic role.
- Special Committees: Creating a parallel structure within NATO for operations where Turkey’s involvement might be counterproductive.
- Waiting Out Changes: Historically, NATO has waited for changes in government or policy within member states, hoping for a return to alignment with NATO’s values.
The Strategic Balancing Act
- Nuclear and Conventional Deterrence: Turkey’s role in NATO’s nuclear sharing program is significant. Its expulsion would necessitate a reconfiguration of NATO’s deterrence posture, potentially shifting assets or renegotiating terms with other members.
- Cyber and Intelligence: Turkey’s intelligence capabilities and its role in cyber defense are part of NATO’s security apparatus; losing this would be a strategic blow unless compensated by other means.
- Migration and Border Control: Turkey’s position on migration has strategic implications for Europe; its expulsion could lead to increased instability on NATO’s southern flank.
- Refugee and Migration Policy: Turkey’s gatekeeping role in migration would be a significant strategic issue, potentially leading to increased migration pressures on Europe, affecting internal politics and security.
- Economic and energy Security: Turkey’s position in energy transit routes means NATO would need to explore alternative pipelines or energy strategies to secure European energy needs.
NATO’S STRATEGIC RESPONSE
The question of Turkey’s place within NATO is layered with strategic complexities. Beyond the binary choice of expulsion or status quo, NATO must consider a spectrum of scenarios, each with its own set of strategic implications. Each scenario presents NATO with a different strategic path, requiring careful consideration of risks, benefits, and the long-term strategic landscape. The decision isn’t merely about Turkey but about how NATO positions itself globally in an era of shifting alliances and new security challenges.
NATO’s strategic response to Turkey’s challenges should focus on 1) engaging in extensive shuttle diplomacy (keeping open lines of communication) to maintain influence over Turkey, balancing criticism with cooperation, ensuring that Turkey remains within the NATO fold while addressing its contentious actions; 2)offering economic and military incentives to bring Turkey’s actions more in line with NATO’s strategic interests; 3) strategic patience i.e understanding that geopolitical alignments can shift, NATO might need to adopt a long-term view, waiting for political changes within Turkey that could realign it more closely with NATO’s objectives.
Furthermore, NATO should prepare itself for multiple scenarios, including a future where Turkey might voluntarily leave or significantly realign its foreign policy.
Scenario 1: Containment and Reintegration
- Description: Instead of expulsion, NATO focuses on containing Turkey’s more controversial actions while working towards reintegration through diplomatic and strategic incentives.
- Strategic Implications: Positive: Maintains NATO’s cohesion, leverages Turkey’s strategic assets, and potentially reforms Turkey’s alignment with NATO’s values. Negative: Requires patience and resources, with the risk that reintegration might not occur as hoped, leading to prolonged internal discord within NATO.
Scenario 2: Partial Disengagement
- Description: NATO reduces Turkey’s involvement in sensitive operations, sharing less critical intelligence, and slowly scaling back military cooperation where Turkey’s actions are seen as detrimental.
- Strategic Implications: Positive: Allows for a gradual adjustment to NATO’s operations without the shock of expulsion, maintaining some level of control over Turkey’s strategic capabilities. Negative: Could lead to Turkey feeling isolated or resentful, potentially pushing it towards other alliances or acting independently in ways harmful to NATO’s interests.
Scenario 3: Strategic Pivot
- Description: NATO pivots its strategic focus in the region, enhancing partnerships with other countries like Greece, Cyprus, Israel, or Egypt to counterbalance Turkey’s influence or to secure similar strategic benefits.
- Strategic Implications: Positive: Diversifies NATO’s strategic assets, reduces dependency on Turkey, and potentially strengthens NATO’s position in the Mediterranean and Middle East. Negative: Might provoke Turkey to escalate tensions, could be seen as an affront, leading to a more aggressive foreign policy from Turkey or even a military escalation.
Scenario 4: Turkey’s voluntary exit *****
- Description: Under pressure or due to internal political shifts, Turkey decides to leave NATO, invoking Article 13 of the NATO Treaty to withdraw after giving one year’s notice.
- Strategic Implications: Positive: Avoids the legal and political headache of expulsion, allowing NATO to plan for the transition. Negative: NATO loses all immediate strategic benefits from Turkey abruptly, necessitating rapid strategic realignment, with less control over the process and outcomes.
Scenario 5: Dual Membership or Hybrid Model
- Description: Turkey maintains its NATO membership but also engages in strategic partnerships outside of NATO, creating a dual or hybrid membership status where Turkey selectively participates in NATO activities.
- Strategic Implications: Positive: Keeps Turkey within the NATO fold for critical operations while allowing it some strategic flexibility, possibly reducing tensions. Negative: Complicates NATO’s command and operational structures, potentially leads to information leaks or conflicting strategic interests.
Scenario 6: Increased NATO Autonomy from Turkey
- Description: NATO develops autonomous capabilities in areas traditionally reliant on Turkey, like missile defense or intelligence gathering in the Middle East, reducing strategic vulnerability.
- Strategic Implications: Positive: Enhances NATO’s resilience and strategic depth, lessening the impact if Turkey’s alignment shifts further away from NATO’s interests. Negative: High cost and time investment, might still not fully compensate for Turkey’s strategic geographic position.
Scenario 7: Strategic Reconciliation
- Description: A concerted effort by NATO to mend relations with Turkey through economic partnerships, security guarantees, or addressing Turkey’s security concerns within NATO frameworks.
- Strategic Implications: Positive: Could lead to a stronger, more unified NATO, with Turkey’s strategic importance leveraged to mutual benefit. Negative: Requires significant political will across NATO members, with the risk that reconciliation might not fully bridge ideological or policy gaps.
CONCLUSION
It remains a mystery why the authors of the North Atlantic Treaty neglected to add a dismissal provision to the charter. There are a number of explanations available, including the possibility that NATO’s original architects did not expect the alliance to exist for more than a few decades (or at least not after the Soviet Union dissolved). Some may have believed that no member would be stupid or reckless enough to act in ways counter to the alliance’s interests and prerogatives. It is also realistic to believe that the alliance’s first proponents failed to anticipate that NATO would take in so many members, which of course makes any reforms more difficult to achieve.
The expulsion of Turkey from NATO, while legally conceivable through the notion of a material breach, remains politically and strategically imprudent. NATO’s strength lies in its unity and the collective security it offers, which would be severely compromised by Turkey’s expulsion. Furthermore, the expulsion of Turkey from NATO would not only be a legal quagmire but a strategic blunder of immense proportions. NATO must navigate this situation with a strategic focus on maintaining its global influence, securing its strategic interests, and ensuring the alliance’s cohesion.
The strategic calculus here is not about the possibility of expulsion but how NATO can adapt and leverage its relationship with Turkey to serve the broader objectives of peace, stability, and collective defense in an ever-changing geopolitical landscape.
This exploration into the possibility of expelling Turkey from NATO underlines the intricate balance between legal rights and political realities within international alliances. Overall, the absence of a suspension and expulsion mechanism in the North Atlantic Treaty does not prevent the North Atlantic Council from suspending or terminating the membership of an ally found to be in material breach of the treaty. Suspending, let alone terminating, a nation’s membership of NATO would be an extreme measure to be contemplated only once other attempts to restore unity and respect for the Alliance’s founding principles have been exhausted.
Nevertheless, the absence of a NATO suspension provision has produced a situation where members are unaccountable for the decisions they make and unafraid of punitive action from the alliance as a whole. The Turkish military offensive against Kurdish-held areas in Syria is an extreme example of how a NATO state can use the rules to its own advantage. NATO’s future actions towards Turkey will likely continue to be characterized by this delicate dance of diplomacy and strategic interests – akin to playing a multidimensional chess game where every move must account for not just the immediate board but the potential future configurations of global geopolitics. In the realm of international alliances, strategic foresight often dictates that maintaining unity is paramount, even when dealing with complex members like Turkey.
Needless to say that NATO’s future strategy will likely hinge on a delicate balance of power, influence, and diplomacy.
