From Flying Carpet Diplomacy to the Hamas Dilemna in the Era of Trump’s Gaza Plan
The persistent question of whether Qatar is finally prepared to sever its relationship with Hamas reflects a fundamental tension at the heart of contemporary Middle Eastern geopolitics and small state theory. This article examines Qatar’s evolving posture toward Hamas through the theoretical lens of small state diplomacy, drawing upon the emirate’s distinctive “flying carpet diplomacy” and its transformation under Emir Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani’s revolutionary foreign policy paradigm that commenced in 1995.
Qatar’s relationship with Hamas epitomizes what Mehran Kamrava conceptualizes as “subtle power” – the capacity to exert influence through behind-the-scenes agenda setting, careful calibration of relationships, and strategic positioning between competing power centers. This subtle power has enabled Qatar to maintain simultaneous relationships with the United States, Iran, Israel, and Palestinian militant organizations, creating what critics characterize as a “dangerous double game”. The current moment, marked by Hamas’s partial acceptance of Trump’s 20-point Gaza proposal and Qatar’s active mediation role, presents a critical juncture for understanding whether Qatar’s hedging strategy has reached its structural limits.
Small State Diplomacy and the Flying Carpet Paradigm
Qatar’s foreign policy since 1995 challenges traditional assumptions within international relations theory regarding small state behavior. Classical realist frameworks predict that small states should align with powerful patrons and avoid high-profile diplomatic initiatives that might provoke larger neighbors (Mearsheimer, 2014). However, Qatar’s trajectory under Emir Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani demonstrated that small states can pursue what Babak Mohammadzadeh terms “status-driven behavior,” seeking to overcome material disadvantages through diplomatic innovation and strategic positioning.
The concept of “flying carpet diplomacy,” popularized by The Economist in 2012, captures Qatar’s unique approach to international relations. This metaphor suggests an ability to transcend geographical and political constraints through financial resources, media influence, and carefully cultivated relationships with diverse actors. David Roberts conceptualizes this phenomenon through “nested power theory,” arguing that Qatar’s influence derives from its ability to embed itself within multiple, sometimes contradictory, power structures simultaneously. This nested positioning allows Qatar to maintain relevance across different geopolitical configurations while minimizing the risks associated with exclusive alignment.
Kamrava’s “subtle power” framework provides additional analytical depth, identifying four key components of Qatar’s foreign policy architecture: hedging strategies that maintain relationships across ideological divides, military security guarantees primarily through U.S. protection, branding and hyperactive diplomacy, and strategic international investments. This combination enabled Qatar to punch significantly above its weight during the period from 1995 to 2013, when regional power vacuums created opportunities for entrepreneurial diplomacy.
The Hamad Transformation and Hamas Engagement
The foundation of Qatar’s contemporary relationship with Hamas traces to the broader foreign policy transformation initiated by Emir Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani following his ascension to power in 1995. This transformation represented a decisive break from Qatar’s previous subordination to Saudi Arabia and launched what scholars characterize as Qatar’s emergence as an independent regional actor (Roberts, 2017; Kamrava, 2015). Qatar’s initial engagement with Hamas began in 2006 at the explicit request of the United States, according to informed sources, reflecting Washington’s desire to establish communication channels with the organization following its electoral victory in Gaza. This arrangement exemplified Qatar’s utility as an intermediary capable of maintaining relationships that were legally or politically impossible for other actors. The 2008-2009 period marked a deepening of this relationship when Khaled Meshaal was invited to attend the Doha Summit, where he was seated alongside then-Emir Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani.
The strategic logic underlying Qatar’s Hamas engagement reflects several interconnected factors. First, Qatar’s constitutional mandate, enshrined in Article 7, commits the state to peaceful conflict resolution and mediation. Second, the relationship served Qatar’s broader regional ambitions by positioning Doha as an indispensable mediator in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Third, supporting Hamas aligned with Qatar’s strategy of backing Islamist movements, particularly those connected to the Muslim Brotherhood, as part of its soft power projection throughout the Arab world. However, this engagement also reflected pragmatic calculations rather than ideological affinity. As Roberts demonstrates in his analysis of Qatar’s “Islamist” soft power, Doha’s support for various Islamist groups represented strategic opportunism rather than doctrinal commitment. Qatar’s leaders recognized that the Muslim Brotherhood and its affiliates constituted organized, effective networks capable of implementing projects and maintaining popular legitimacy in ways that secular alternatives often could not.
The Hamas attack on October 7, 2023, exposed fundamental contradictions within Qatar’s hedging strategy that had previously remained manageable. Qatar’s initial response to the attack proved particularly revealing: rather than condemning the violence, the Foreign Ministry blamed Israel “solely responsible for the ongoing escalation” and criticized Israeli “violations of international law”. This response demonstrated the structural limitations of Qatar’s balancing act when confronted with unambiguous acts of terrorism. The attack created a “critical juncture” – a moment when existing institutional arrangements face severe stress and actors must choose between competing loyalties (Capoccia & Kelemen, 2007). For Qatar, October 7 represented the collision of its role as a U.S. ally hosting the largest American military base in the Middle East with its position as Hamas’s primary financial patron and diplomatic protector.
Israel’s subsequent strike on Hamas leaders in Doha on September 9, 2025, further intensified these contradictions. The attack, while failing to eliminate its intended targets, shattered the fiction that Qatar could provide sanctuary for terrorist leadership while maintaining its mediator credentials. As Amit Segal observes, “Israel’s decision to strike there with quiet American approval marked a crucial moment in the war. It signaled that between the West and fundamentalist terror one must choose a side”.
The Trump Plan and Qatar’s Mediation Calculus
President Trump’s 20-point Gaza proposal, announced on September 29, 2025, presents Qatar with both opportunity and constraint. The plan’s emphasis on Hamas disarmament, international oversight, and eventual Palestinian statehood creates a framework that potentially aligns with Qatar’s long-term interests in regional stability while challenging its immediate relationship with Hamas leadership. Qatar’s response to the Trump proposal reveals the sophistication of its diplomatic positioning. Rather than immediately endorsing the plan, Qatar has emphasized its commitment to mediation while carefully managing Hamas’s expectations. Foreign Ministry spokesperson Dr. Al Ansari stated that Qatar maintains “emotional neutrality while exerting significant diplomatic effort” and holds “deep conviction in the necessity of ending this humanitarian catastrophe”. This language reflects Qatar’s attempt to maintain credibility with all parties while subtly pressuring Hamas toward acceptance.
The negotiations in Sharm El Sheikh, involving U.S. special envoy Steve Witkoff, Jared Kushner, and Qatari Foreign Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani, represent a critical test of Qatar’s mediation capacity. Hamas’s partial acceptance of the proposal – agreeing to release hostages while refusing disarmament – creates a complex diplomatic challenge that requires Qatar to balance its relationship with Hamas against its broader strategic interests.
Scholarly analysis of Qatar’s relationship with Hamas reveals sharp divisions regarding the sustainability and morality of Doha’s approach. Critics argue that Qatar’s “double game” fundamentally undermines international counterterrorism efforts and regional stability. The Foundation for Defense of Democracies notes that “Qatari support for Hamas has facilitated relentless violence” and that “under Qatari patronage, Hamas has fought five separate wars against Israel”. This critique gains theoretical support from alliance theory and collective action research, which suggests that attempts to maintain relationships with mutually antagonistic parties ultimately prove unsustainable (Snyder, 1997). The argument holds that Qatar’s hedging strategy creates moral hazard by reducing the costs of extremist behavior for Hamas while providing the organization with resources and legitimacy that enable continued violence. Conversely, proponents of Qatar’s approach emphasize the pragmatic necessity of maintaining communication channels with non-state actors in complex conflict environments. This perspective, rooted in mediation theory and conflict resolution literature, argues that effective peace processes require inclusive dialogue that encompasses all relevant stakeholders, regardless of their formal designation (Zartman, 2007). From this view, Qatar’s relationship with Hamas serves broader international interests by preventing complete diplomatic isolation of the organization.
The academic literature on small state diplomacy provides additional theoretical support for Qatar’s approach. Cooper and Momani’s research on small state behavior demonstrates that successful small states often occupy “niche” positions that larger powers cannot fill due to political constraints. Qatar’s ability to maintain relationships across ideological divides reflects this niche specialization rather than opportunistic fence-sitting. The current diplomatic moment presents Qatar with unprecedented challenges to its traditional hedging strategy. Several factors suggest that the costs of maintaining simultaneous relationships with Hamas and Western allies have increased dramatically: First, the scale and brutality of the October 7 attack created international consensus regarding Hamas’s terrorist character that makes continued support increasingly difficult to justify. Second, Israel’s willingness to strike Hamas leaders in Doha demonstrates that Qatar’s sovereignty cannot protect terrorist assets indefinitely. Third, the Trump administration’s explicit linkage of continued U.S.-Qatar cooperation to progress on Gaza creates direct pressure for results.
However, abandoning Hamas entirely would also impose significant costs on Qatar. The organization represents Qatar’s primary leverage in Palestinian affairs and broader regional dynamics. Moreover, Hamas’s governance role in Gaza means that any reconstruction effort will require some form of accommodation with the organization’s networks and constituencies.
Beyond the Flying Carpet
Qatar’s relationship with Hamas reflects broader tensions within contemporary international relations between state sovereignty, counterterrorism imperatives, and conflict resolution necessities. The emirate’s “flying carpet diplomacy” enabled remarkable achievements in regional mediation during the period from 1995 to 2013, when regional power vacuums created space for entrepreneurial small state behavior. However, the current moment suggests that this approach faces structural limitations when confronted with clear-cut moral and strategic choices.
The question of whether Qatar is “finally ready to split with Hamas” oversimplifies a more complex strategic calculation. Rather than a binary choice between alignment and abandonment, Qatar seeks to transform its relationship with Hamas in ways that preserve its mediation capacity while responding to international pressure. This transformation may involve gradual distancing from Hamas’s military wing while maintaining engagement with its political leadership, supporting Palestinian governance structures that reduce Hamas’s exclusive control, and leveraging its financial resources to create incentives for moderation. The success of this approach will depend largely on external factors beyond Qatar’s control, including Israeli willingness to accept negotiated solutions, Hamas’s capacity for internal reform, and continued U.S. commitment to supporting Gulf allies despite disagreements over specific policies. What remains clear is that Qatar’s traditional hedging strategy requires fundamental adaptation to remain viable in an increasingly polarized regional environment where, as Amit Segal observes, actors must ultimately “choose a side” between terrorism and legitimate governance.
The flying carpet, it appears, can no longer soar above the harsh realities of contemporary Middle Eastern geopolitics. Qatar’s challenge lies in engineering a soft landing that preserves its regional influence while acknowledging the moral and strategic imperatives that the October 7 attacks have made impossible to ignore.
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